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This Article studies business deadlocks and their resolution. We advance
a proposal to reform the way that courts resolve business deadlocks and value
business assets. Specifically, we argue that Shotgun mechanisms, where the
court mandates one owner to name a single buy-sell price and compels the
other owner to either buy or sell shares at the named price, should play a
larger role in the judicial management of business divorce. Since the party
proposing the offer may end up either buying or selling shares, the party has an
incentive to identify and name a fair price. In addition, Shotgun mechanisms
will avoid inefficient delays and administrative costs associated with external
appraisers and auctions. Our proposal works within the framework of current
statutory rules and case law. General partnerships and limited liability
companies (LLCs), the most commonly chosen legal entities, are the focus of
this study.
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Introduction
"The answer is easy ifyou take it logically.
I'd like to help you in your struggle to be free.
There must be [thrifty] ways to leave your lover.
Like soon-to-be-married couples, future business partners often fail to
plan for the possibility that their working relationship will deteriorate due to
irreconcilable differences or how the business assets will be divided in the
event of "divorce." As a consequence, judges are often called upon to intervene
and resolve business deadlocks. Prolonged resolution processes, cost-inefficient
administration of those processes, and inequitable outcomes impose high
monetary and non-monetary costs on the parties themselves and on society as a
whole.
I . PAUL SIMON, 50 Ways to Leave Your Lover, on STILL CRAZY AFTER ALL THESE
YEARS (Warner Bros. 1975) (edited text in brackets, fifty was replaced with thrifty).
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Haley v. Talcott,2 a case decided by the Delaware Court of Chancery in
December 2004, provides an illustrative example. In 2001, Matt Haley and
Greg Talcott started the Redfin Grill, a restaurant in Bethany Beach, Delaware.
Talcott provided the start-up capital and Haley managed the restaurant without
drawing a salary for the first year.3 In 2003, the parties "tied the knot" and
4
formed Matt & Greg Real Estate, LLC, a fifty-fifty limited liability company.
In May 2003, the LLC borrowed $720,000 from a local bank, personally
guaranteed by both Haley and Talcott; purchased the real estate beneath the
Redfin Grill; and leased the property to the restaurant.5 By late 2003, the
business relationship between Haley and Talcott began to deteriorate. Talcott
attempted to terminate Haley's participation in Redfin Grill business activities
by purporting to accept Haley's resignation and forbidding him to enter the
restaurant premises. Haley subsequently purported to revoke the lease between
the Matt & Greg Real Estate, LLC and the restaurant.7 Because the LLC
required unanimity for business decisions, neither party could make major
changes without the consent of the other: they were deadlocked.
Eschewing the exit provision that he and Talcott had included in their
LLC operating agreement, Haley sued for the judicial dissolution of Matt &
Greg Real Estate, LLC.9 Vice Chancellor Strine found that "the exit mechanism
fail[ed] as an adequate remedy for Haley" because it did not release Haley from
the personal guaranties regarding the mortgage loan. 10 The court ruled that
judicial dissolution of the LLC was the appropriate remedy:
I find that it is not reasonably practicable for the LLC to continue to carry on
business in conformity with the LLC Agreement. The parties shall confer and,
within four weeks, submit a plan for the dissolution of the LLC. The plan shall
include a procedure to sell the Property owned by the LLC within a
commercially reasonable time frame. Either party may, of course, bid on the
Property.
t '
2. 864 A.2d 86 (Del. Ch. 2004).
3. Id. at 89.
4. Id. at 90.
5. Id. at 90-91.
6. Id. at 91. Haley responded that he did not resign, and asserted that Talcott's attempt
to terminate him was a breach of the employment contract. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 92.
10. Id. at 98.
11. Id. Section 18-802 of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act provides: "On
application by or for a member or manager, the Court of Chancery may decree dissolution of a limited
liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with a
limited liability company agreement." Note that the exit provision did not state that any member
dissatisfied with the status quo must break an impasse by exit rather than by a suit for dissolution.
Haley, 864 A.2d at 92.
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Business deadlocks emerge when disagreement between the parties regarding a
fundamental business policy cannot be resolved due to the absence of majority
vote or unanimity. In organizations with an even number of owners, especially
those with just two owners, deadlock can be a very serious problem. Resolving
these bitter business feuds can be an arduous, time-consuming, and expensive
process involving the services of lawyers, expert witnesses, appraisers, and
judges.12 The resolution of business deadlock in unincorporated business
associations might involve the dissociation of joint owners or the dissolution of
the business entity. The completion of the dissociation or dissolution procedure
requires the buyout of the dissociated owner by the other owners or the sale of
the business assets, respectively. Asset valuation, which is necessary to
complete the transfer of assets, is a critical aspect of this process.
Placing a dollar value on the assets of a closely-held business organization
can be a very tricky matter. In contrast to publicly-traded companies with
active markets for equity ownership and the scrutiny of outside investors, it is
often very difficult for outsiders to evaluate the operations and business
opportunities of closely-held firms. The economic value of these businesses is
often intertwined with the human capital of the founders, their personal
relationships with business associates (suppliers and buyers), and the tacit
business knowledge they possess. Thus, the value of these closely-held
businesses may not be fully reflected in the official business documents or
financial statements. Instead, the best knowledge about the value of the
business assets may reside in the minds of the business owners themselves.
This Article studies business deadlocks and their resolution. We advance a
proposal to reform the way that courts resolve business deadlocks and divide
the assets between business owners. Specifically, we argue that Shotgun
mechanisms, where the court mandates one owner to name a single buy-sell
price and compels the other owner to either buy or sell shares at that named
price, should play a larger role in the judicial resolution of business deadlock.13
These mechanisms represent an application of the classic cake-cutting
procedure: one member cuts the cake (names a price) and the other member
chooses his or her piece (buys or sells shares at that price).14 Since the party
12. Other costs might include the distraction of the managers and employees.
13. Damerow Ford Co. v. Bradshaw provides an example of the use of the "Shotgun"
terminology. 876 P.2d 788 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). These provisions are also called Russian roulette
agreements, Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 601 P.2d 475 (Or. Ct. App. 1979), put-call options,
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Residential Developers Fund Partners, No. 90-1195, 1991 WL 193363 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 17, 1991), Texas Shootouts, RDO Foods Co. v. U.S. Int'l, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 962 (D.N.D.
2002), or simply buy-sell mechanisms, Universal Studios Inc. v. Viacom Inc., 705 A.2d. 579 (Del. Ch.
1997).
14. For a survey of cake-cutting mechanisms, see STEVEN BRAMS & ALAN TAYLOR,
FAIR DIVISION: FROM CAKE-CUTTING TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1996). Articles in the legal literature
have explored the general benefits of self-valuation, including cake-cutting mechanisms. See, e.g.,
Michael Abramowicz, The Law-and-Markets Movement, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 327 (1999); Ian Ayres &
Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104




proposing the offer may end up either buying or selling shares, the party has an
incentive to identify and name a fair price. Thus, equitable outcomes are
achieved without the administration costs and delays associated with external
appraisers and auctions.' 5 We show that our proposal is aligned with current
statutory rules and case law. General partnerships and limited liability
companies (LLCs), the most commonly chosen legal entities, are the focus of
this study.
7
Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REv. 771 (1982). In the
economics literature, Richard Brooks, Claudia Landeo and Kathryn Spier study theoretically and
experimentally non-mandatory Shotgun mechanisms in a common value setting with asymmetric
information. Richard R. W. Brooks, Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Trigger Happy or Gun
Shy? Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts, 41 RAND J. ECON. 649 (2010). In
Trigger Happy or Gun Shy?, the authors demonstrate that owners eschew buy-sell offers in favor of
simple offers to buy or to sell shares and bargaining failures arise. In a later article, Landeo and Spier
provide a theoretical and experimental analysis of mandatory Shotgun mechanisms in a common value
environment with asymmetric information and show that inequitable and inefficient outcomes may
occur with an unassigned offeror. Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Shotgun Mechanisms for
Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem, 121 ECON. LETTERS, 390 (2013).
Vincent Crawford assesses the game-theoretic properties of the mandatory "divide-and-choose" method.
He demonstrates that the allocations generated by these mechanisms are "envy-free" in the sense that
neither party prefers the allocation received by the other, but they do not necessarily satisfy Pareto
efficiency or equity. Vincent P. Crawford, A Game ofFair Division, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 253 (1977).
In later works, Crawford proposes two procedures for overcoming these deficiencies: setting the
offeree's payoff in the case of rejection equal to a fair division (to achieve efficiency) and auctioning the
role of the offeror (to achieve equity). Vincent P. Crawford, A Procedure for Generating Pareto-
Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations, 47 ECONOMETRICA 49 (1979); Vincent P. Crawford, A
Self-Administered Solution of the Bargaining Problem, 47 REv. ECON. STUD. 385 (1980). In a common
value context with independent private signals, John Morgan shows that these mechanisms favor the
receiver and are unfair. An arbitrator can implement the fair outcome by choosing one partner to name a
price and then flipping a coin to determine who buys and who sells. John Morgan, Dissolving a
Partnership (Un)fairly, 23 ECON. THEORY 909 (2004). Using a mechanism-design approach, R. Preston
McAfee studies partnership dissolution mechanisms in an independent private values environment. R.
Preston McAfee, Amicable Divorce: Dissolving a Partnership with Simple Mechanisms, 56 J. ECON.
THEORY 266 (1992). He shows that the person receiving the buy-sell offer is in a relatively
advantageous position, and that these mechanisms may result in inefficient outcomes. Peter Cramton,
Robert Gibbons, and Paul Klemperer explore alternative partnership dissolution mechanisms, such as a
simultaneous sealed-bid auction where the partner with the high bid gets the partnership asset at a price
equal to a pre-determined combination of the two bids. Peter R. Cramton, Robert Gibbons & Paul
Klemperer, Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently, 55 ECONOMETRICA 615 (1987). In a recent theoretical
work, Maria Angeles de Frutos and Thomas Kittsteiner argue that the inefficiency of buy-sell
mechanisms is mitigated if the parties bid to determine the offeror. Maria Angeles de Frutos & Thomas
Kittsteiner, Efficient Partnership Dissolution Under Buy-Sell Clauses, 39 RAND J. ECoN. 184 (2008).
Other economists have analyzed the partnership dissolution problem in settings characterized by
interdependent values and asymmetric information. They show that efficiency is even harder to achieve
in these settings. Karsten Fieseler, Thomas Kittsteiner & Benny Moldovanu, Partnerships, Lemons, and
Efficient Trade, 113 J. ECON. THEORY 223 (2003); Philippe Jehiel & Ady Pauzner, Partnership
Dissolution with Interdependent Values, 37 RAND J. ECON. 1 (2006). For other examples of economic
scholarship in this area, see also Benny Moldovanu, How to Dissolve a Partnership, 158 J. INST. &
THEORETICAL EcON. 66 (2002), Deborah Minehart & Zvika Neeman, Termination and Coordination in
Partnerships, 8 J. EcoN. & MGMT. STRATEGY 191 (1999), and Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, Profit
Sharing and the Role ofProfessional Partnerships, 120 QUART. J. EcON. 131 (2005).
15. An outcome is said to be "equitable" if the allocation of value between the owners
accurately reflects the ownership stakes stipulated in the business agreement.
16. According to Professor Bainbridge, in the year 2001, general partnerships and
limited liability companies represented seventy-nine percent of the total business entities in the U.S.
(IRS tax return data, 2001). See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS & LLCs 101
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We begin the construction of our arguments by exploring privately-
contracted Shotgun provisions.18 These mechanisms have become increasingly
common and practically boilerplate clauses in certain business areas including
real estate joint ventures.19  Our analysis of the private design and
implementation of Shotgun clauses derives important lessons and insights for
the judicial resolution of business deadlock. By studying the ways that these
provisions are drafted and implemented in private contracts, and identifying
their shortcomings in private contractual settings, we gain a deeper
understanding of the proper use of Shotguns as a judicial resolution
mechanism.
Our analysis demonstrates that Shotgun mechanisms have several
desirable properties. First, under the right circumstances, the Shotgun
mechanism leads to a fair and equitable division of the assets. Since the party
making the offer may end up on either side of the transaction, the incentive to
make a "low-ball offer" is eliminated. In his opinion in Valinote v. Ballis, Judge
Easterbook states that "[t]he possibility that the person naming the price can be
forced either to buy or to sell keeps the first mover honest." 20
Second, Shotgun mechanisms are expedient. In contrast to standard
negotiations where there are offers and counteroffers, one party can unilaterally
trigger the Shotgun provision and force the timely transfer of assets: once the
electing member gives notice and names a price, the notified member must
respond within a specific number of days and is compelled to either buy or sell
his stake in the company.21 This feature of Shotgun clauses might be of
particular value in deadlock situations, where there are likely to be significant
psychological and behavioral barriers to meaningful bilateral negotiations. If
the two parties have irreconcilable differences, and are not on speaking terms, it
may be difficult to get both parties to the proverbial bargaining table. One party
may be willing to negotiate, but the other may stubbornly refuse to cooperate.
With a Shotgun clause, only one of the two parties needs to be willing to
(2004). Although the focus of this study is on partnerships and LLCs, this mechanism is also useful for
closely-held corporations for which asset markets might not be available.
17. Under the Uniform Partnership Act and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, joint
ventures are governed by partnership law. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1914); REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1997);
see, e.g., Paragon Bldg. Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co., 567 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); Bank of
California v. Connolly, 36 Cal. App. 3d 350, 364 (1973); Hagerman v. Schulte, 181 N.E. 677, 681 (Ill.
1932); Greenup v. Hewett, 235 S.W.2d 1000, 1002 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951); Simpson v. Richmond Worsted
Spinning Co., 145 A. 250, 254 (Me. 1929). Therefore, the analysis presented here also often applies to
the case ofjoint ventures.
18. The model real estate development operating agreement recently published by ABA
includes a Shotgun provision. Joint Task Force of Committee on LLCs, Partnerships and
Unincorporated Entities and the Committee on Taxation, ABA Section of Business Law, Model Real
Estate Development Operating Agreement with Commentary, 63 Bus. LAW. 385, 472-78 (2008)
[hereinafter Model Real Estate Development Operating Agreement].
19. Id.; Brooks, Landeo & Spier, supra note 14.
20. 295 F.3d. 666, 667 (7th Cir. 2002).
21. Typically, the completion of a Shotgun transaction involves less than sixty days.




participate in setting the price for the sale since, once triggered (i.e., once a
proposal has been made by the offeror), the provision compels the participation
of the offeree.
Third, the Shotgun mechanism is cost-efficient because it does not require
the participation of a costly outside appraiser or auctioneer. Note that Shotgun
mechanisms might serve as an important backdrop or outside option for
decentralized negotiations between the parties as well.
Under the wrong conditions, however, we show that Shotgun mechanisms
can backfire. Asymmetries between the business owners in terms of
information, capabilities, and financial resources might elicit unwanted
strategic behavior and opportunism, and hence lead to inequitable and cost-
inefficient outcomes. Suppose for example, that one party were to become
disabled or otherwise unable to manage the company without the active
participation of the other party. The more capable party might manufacture a
deadlock and strategically trigger the Shotgun provision in order to buy out the
disadvantaged party at a low price. Similar opportunistic behavior can arise
when one party is in a disadvantaged financial situation, or when one party
lacks the information to properly assign value to the business assets. Although
these adverse effects can certainly be mitigated by ex ante contractual
agreement between the parties, some residual risk associated with these
provisions will inevitably remain.
We proceed with the construction of our arguments by studying the
properties of judicially-implemented Shotgun mechanisms. While the risks
associated with asymmetries are relevant in the judicial context, just as they are
in private contractual settings, these risks will generally be less severe when the
Shotgun mechanism is designed and implemented by a judge. Since courts have
the ability to design the Shotgun procedure ex post rather than ex ante, they are
often in a better position to identify the presence and nature of the asymmetries
and to tailor the Shotgun mechanism accordingly. Specifically, courts can: (1)
avoid the negative effects of asymmetric information by assigning the role of
offeror to the better-informed owner; (2) attenuate the shortcomings of
asymmetric financial resources by providing the parties with sufficient time to
arrange for financing of the buy-sell operations; and (3) offset the weaknesses
related to asymmetric capabilities by assigning the role of offeror to the less-
capable owner. Moreover, if Shotgun mechanisms become a commonly-applied
valuation procedure and default remedy for the judicial resolution of business
deadlock, then more equitable private outcomes will be obtained as parties will
22. Shotgun provisions typically give the owners discretion over whether to trigger the
clause. Thus, these clauses do not preclude the parties from returning to the negotiation table. However,
the Shotgun clause might influence these negotiations and induce more equitable outcomes. If there
were no Shotgun clause, then the parties would be negotiating in the shadow of either continued
deadlock, which would drain the business organization of ongoing value, or the prospect of judicial
intervention which may involve significant direct expense and possibly inefficient resolution (e.g.,
piecemeal liquidation).
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bargain in the shadow of the Shotgun mechanism and settle their differences
out of court. Despite their obvious potential benefits, courts in the United States
seldom use Shotgun mechanisms to resolve business deadlocks. Fulk v.
23Washington Service Associates, Inc. provides a rare example. In contrast,
Canadian judges frequently apply Shotgun mechanisms when resolving
business divorce. The Canadian experience demonstrates the feasibility of the
implementation of our proposal.24
Finally, we provide experimental evidence regarding the ex post judicial
design of Shotgun mechanisms. Although our arguments regarding the ex post
judicial design of Shotgun mechanisms are logically consistent and supported
by current legal cases, actual field data on deadlock resolution processes and
outcomes is not available. Therefore, we conduct a series of controlled
laboratory experiments with human subjects to assess whether the court-
mandated assignment of the role of the offeror to the better-informed owner
will have the predicted effects.25 Our experimental design simulates a
deadlocked business venture where two owners needed to divide the business
assets. In contrast to the traditional cake-cutting problem, only one of the two
owners knew the value of the business assets (the size of the cake). Two
experimental treatments are considered. In the first treatment, the better-
informed owner is compelled to make buy-sell offer; in the second treatment,
the less-informed owner is forced to make the offer.
Our experimental findings support our arguments: equitable outcomes
occur more frequently when the role of offeror is assigned to the better-
informed owner. When obligated to make a buy-sell offer, the better-informed
owner truthfully revealed his private information to the less-informed owner.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first experimental study of mandatory
Shotgun mechanisms where one party knows the value of the assets while the
other does not.
The Article is divided into four Parts. Part I studies the nature of business
deadlock in general partnerships and limited liability companies. It first
discusses the statutory rules regarding management rights, and identifies the
circumstances under which these organizations might encounter business
deadlock. It then outlines private contractual arrangements that might help
prevent deadlock. Part II analyzes the private resolution of business deadlocks.
It first outlines the dissociation and dissolution procedures under the current
statutory rules. It then evaluates the properties of three commonly-used
valuation mechanisms, Shotgun mechanisms, private auctions, and external
23. No. 17747-NC, 2002 WL 1402273 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002). See infra Subsection
III.C.2.
24. See Kinzie v. Dells, 2010 BCSC 1360 (Can. B.C.); Whistler Service Park Ltd. v.
Glacier Creek Dev., 2005 BCSC 1942 (Can. B.C.); Lee v. Lee, 2002 BCSC 1077 (Can. B.C.); Safarik v.
Ocean Fisheries Ltd. (1996), 17 B.C.L.R. 3d 354 (Can. B.C.C.A.). See infra Part I.






appraisal, and identifies the circumstances under which the use of the Shotgun
mechanism is recommended.27 Part III investigates the judicial resolution of
business deadlock. It first illustrates the current court-intervention procedures.
It then proposes the expanded use of the Shotgun mechanism by judges to
resolve business deadlock and demonstrates that this proposal is aligned with
statutes and case law. Part IV presents experimental evidence on the benefits of
Shotgun mechanisms under the appropriate ex post judicial design.
I. Business Deadlock
Business deadlocks can arise when parties have fundamental
disagreements regarding essential business policies that cannot be resolved due
to the absence of majority vote or unanimity. In business entities with an even
number of owners, especially those with just two owners, deadlock is a
potentially severe problem. The situation described in Palmieri v. A. C. Paving
Co. is typical:
[T]here is an equal split or nearly equal split of shares and control; there is a
serious and persistent disagreement as to some important questions respecting
the management or functioning of the [organization]; there is a resulting
deadlock; and the deadlock paralyzes and seriously interferes with the normal
operations of the [organization]. 28
Deadlock problems in general partnerships and LLCs can be generally tracked
to the owners' management rights: the rights to participate in the business
decisions and the decision-making processes used in these organizations.
A. Management Rights
Co-management is a core characteristic of partnerships. In fact, under the
default rules of both the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) and the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), 29 each partner is entitled to the following
26. Note that the right of first refusal (ROFR) and the right of first offer (ROFO)
provisions are not commonly used as business deadlock resolution clauses. Instead, these clauses are
implemented as exit clauses (i.e., in cases in which one party requires to exit the organization) for
reasons not necessarily related to deadlocks. Given that the focus of this study is on business deadlock
situations, we abstracted from the analysis of ROFR and ROFO clauses.
27. The theoretical economics literature on partnership dissolution studies Shotgun and
auction mechanisms under more general environments than those presented here. See, e.g., Brooks,
Landeo & Spier, supra note 14; de Frutos & Kittsteiner, supra note 14. For a practical guide to the
economics literature on auction theory, see Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature,
13 J. ECON. SuRvEYs 227 (1999).
28. (1999) 48 B.L.R. (2d) 130, 137 (B.C.S.C.).
29. The Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
(RUPA) were adopted by most states. As a result, uniformity was achieved. See BAINBRIDGE, supra
note 16, at 100.
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management rights: (1) the right to know about the business operations (right to
information); (2) the right to be included in the management of the business;
and, (3) the right to participate in collective decisions, made in some cases by
majority rule or consent,30 and, in other cases, by unanimity rule (partner's
right to veto).31 Under these statutes, each partner has equal decision-making
power (i.e., voting rights are assigned on a per capita basis).32
Disagreements may arise in the course of making ordinary business
decisions or in circumstances involving decisions regarding extraordinary (i.e.,
highly unusual) business policies. 3 3 Under both UPA and RUPA default rules,
disagreement regarding ordinary matters is resolved by majority rule. However,
the approval of extraordinary matters requires unanimity. 34  Importantly,
30. The majority rule might be implemented through vote or consent. As Professor
Kleinberger explains, "'Vote' implies a more formal procedure than 'consent,' . . . . The MERRIAM
WEBSTER DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1974) defines 'consent' as 'to give assent or approval' and 'vote' as 'a
usually formal expression of opinion or will in response to a proposed decision."' DANIEL S.
KLEINBERGER, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCs 294 n.21 (4th ed.
2012). National Biscuit Co. v. Stroud provides an illustration of the majority rule requirement. 106 S.E.
2d. 692, 694-95 (N.C. 1959). Stroud and Freeman formed a partnership to operate a grocery store. In
late 1955, Stroud informed National Biscuit that he would not be personally liable for any more bread
National Biscuit sold to the store. During February 1956, Freeman ordered more bread. On February 25,
1956, Stroud and Freeman dissolved their partnership, with all assets going to Stroud. National Biscuit,
not having been paid for the bread ordered by Freeman, sued Stroud. Because there was no majority
vote of the partners to terminate Freeman's authority to buy bread, Stroud's unilateral act was
ineffective. The partnership therefore was bound by Freeman's orders.
31. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 403(b)(c), 401(f), 401(j) (1997); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§
19, 20, 18(e), 18(h), 9(3) (1914). Case law is extremely important in the case of partnerships. RUPA and
UPA both rely on case law to fill statutory gaps. The UPA states that "In any case not provided for in
this act the rules of law and equity, including the law merchant, shall govern." Id. § 5. Referring to
Nicholas v. Hunt, 541 P.2d 820 (Or. 1975), Professors Bromberg and Ribstein argue that "[t]he courts
have added a common law gloss to UPA § 38 by granting a continuation right even in situations that
seem to call for liquidation under § 38(1)." ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG
AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 7.1 1(f) (2012). Similarly, RUPA states, "Unless displaced by
particular provisions of this [Act], the principles of law and equity supplement this [Act]." REVISED
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 104(a) (1997).
32. By default, voting or consent is per capita, regardless of how much: (i) each partner
has contributed to the partnership, and (ii) each partner works in the partnership's business. See REVISED
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 401 (f), (j) (1997); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 18(e), (h) (1914).
33. Under both UPA and RUPA, extraordinary decisions refer to major changes to the
nature of the partnership's business, decisions to increase substantially the size of the business (where
that increase requires a significant increase in the liability exposure of each partner), and changes in the
standards of admitting new partners or expelling old partners, among others. See KLEINBERGER, supra
note 30, at 298.
34. Under UPA section 9(3), unless a partnership agreement provides otherwise, acts
that will make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business of the partnership require unanimous
approval. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 9(3) (1914). Section 18(h) of UPA provides a more general rule for
solving disagreements not covered by UPA section 9(3): "Any difference arising as to ordinary matters
connected with the partnership business may be decided by a majority of the partners; but no act in
contravention of any agreement between the partners may be done rightfully without the consent of all
the partners." Id. § 18(h). Section 18(h), however, fails to include matters that are not ordinary but do
not involve acts in contravention of the partnership agreement. Case law resolves this omission by
generally holding that extraordinary changes require unanimous consent. See KLEINBERGER, supra note
30, at 297. Similarly, under RUPA section 401(j): "A difference arising as to a matter in the ordinary
course of business of a partnership may be decided by a majority of the partners." REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 401(j) (1997). But, "[a]n act outside the ordinary course of business of a partnership and an
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evidence that a proposed change would benefit the partnership would not
change the majority vote or unanimity requirement. 35 Case law holds that,
absent majority vote or unanimity, the partner proposing the (beneficial)
change still loses. As Professor Lindley argues, "[I]f the partners are equally
divided, those who forbid a change must have their way." 36 Even evidence that
the dissenting partner benefits personally from resisting the proposed change
would not be enough to change the legal results.37
State LLC statutes are not uniform.38 In most state statutes, managerial
rights are similar to those outlined in the partnership law: the management
default rule is the member-managed LLC.39 Similarly, the approval of ordinary
and extraordinary matters requires majority and unanimous support,
respectively. In terms of voting rights, some states allocate voting power in
proportion to the contributions made and not returned, that is, pro rata by
financial interest. Other states allocate voting rights on a per capita basis
(similar to partnerships). Section 404(a)(1) of the Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act (ULLCA) also follows the per capita basis approach.40
B. Preventing Business Deadlock
Because most statutory management rules are default rules, it is possible
41to adapt them to the specific needs of the business. Common modifications of
the UPA and RUPA management rules include: (1) delegating to one partner or
a committee some or all decisions regarding business management; (2)
changing the one partner-one vote rule by weighting each partner's rights to
vote or consent in proportion to capital contribution or allocating more votes to
partners who work full-time in the organization; and (3) changing the
unanimous consent requirements. 42
amendment to the partnership agreement may be undertaken only with the consent of all of the
partners." Id. § 401(j).
35. See Sanchez v. Saylor, 13 P.3d 960, 977 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000).
36. WALTER B. LINDLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, Ch. II, § III,
24-8 at 403 (1924). The Idaho Supreme Court cited Professor Lindley's view in Summers v. Dooley, 481
P.2d 318, 321 (Idaho 1971). For a detailed discussion of this case, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at
122-25.
37. See Sanchez, 13 P.3d at 977.
38. The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) was not promulgated until
1996, by which time many states had already adopted LLC codes. As a result, the ULLCA does not
provide a common ground for uniformity. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 179.
39. ULLCA and many state statutes also recognized the case of manager-managed
LLCs. Most statutes limit the right of non-managing members in a manager-managed LLC to act in the
business. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 301(a) (1996); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 184.
40. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 404(a)(1) (1996).
41. Most of these rules are applicable only in the absence of a contrary agreement
among the partners. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103(a) (1997); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §
103(a) (1996); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 18 (1914).
42. For example, unanimous consent requirements can be changed by allowing the
admission of new partners on a two-thirds vote of the current partners, or by approval of a management
committee. See KLEINBERGER, supra note 30, at 299-300.
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However, the flexibility of the default rules is not unlimited. UPA, RUPA,
and ULLCA include restrictions on management restructuring agreements that
might affect a partner's right to information. Professor Kleinberger argues that
modifications of these fundamental obligations might be subject to strong
judicial scrutiny.43 Similarly, although RUPA section 103(a) recognizes that the
relations among the partners, and between the partners and the partnership, are
governed by the partnership agreement, RUPA section 103(b)(2) also sets
limits to the power of these agreements.44 Importantly, transaction costs related
to modifications of default management rules in a two-party fifty-fifty
partnership or LLC might be extremely high.45
II. Lessons from Private Contracting
In closely-held businesses, such as general partnerships and LLCs, an
owner who is dissatisfied with the firm's business performance or the behavior
of the other owner might need to pursue dissociation or dissolution.46
The completion of privately-implemented dissociation or dissolution
procedures involves the buyout of the dissociated owner by the other owners or
the sale of the business assets, respectively. These processes require the
valuation of the business assets. In closely-held businesses, for which asset
markets might not be available, asset valuation can be a particularly difficult
task. By including a buy-sell clause in their business agreement ex ante, the
owners can greatly facilitate the process of asset valuation ex post.
A. Private Resolution: Dissociation and Dissolution
1. General Aspects
This Subsection discusses the statutory basis for privately-implemented
dissociation and dissolution processes in the event of business deadlock.
UPA and RUPA recognize the partner's power to dissolve the partnership.
Under UPA, the dissociation of a partner (by voluntary withdrawal or
43. Id. at 294 n.21; id. at 301 ("A restriction is most likely to be upheld if it: (i) has
some important justification; (ii) is not overbroad; and (iii) does not leave the partners who lack access
vulnerable to oppression.").
44. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 103(a), (b)(2) (1997) (stating that the partnership
agreement may not "unreasonably restrict the right of access to books and records under Section
403(b)"); see also UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 103(b) (1996) (providing similar restrictions).
45. A party with 50% ownership may refuse a private agreement establishing a
mechanism that deviates from the fifty-fifty voting rights.
46. Suits among owners are discouraged by doctrines such as the business judgment
rule and the co-principal doctrine. The parties might also specify in their business agreement that a third
party, such as an arbitrator or another person will serve as a tiebreaker in the case of deadlock. Note that





expulsion) always triggers the dissolution of the business entity.47 After
dissolution, the partnership must be wound up, absent agreement among the
48
partners to carry on the business. The winding-up process prescribes that the
firm's assets will be sold with the proceeds distributed to the partners.49 Hence,
the partners are entitled to the public sale of assets, either as a going concern or
as a piecemeal liquidation. o In the case of dissolution with business
continuation, however, the continuation of the business activities in the hands
of some of the original owners in the post-dissolution period is achieved by
implementing buyout processes in which the other partners buy the assets of the
dissociated partner.51
Under RUPA, dissociation might occur by the express will of the partners.
It might be also triggered by the occurrence of specific events stated in the
partnership agreement as causing a partner's dissociation, or by a partner's
expulsion pursuant to the partnership agreement. Importantly, expulsion
without cause might occur if the partnership agreement permits it.52 For
instance, in Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, the court held that "[a] partnership may
47. In the case of an at-will partnership (i.e., a partnership in which the parties have not
agreed to continue the partnership until the end of some particular term or undertaking), the parties have
the power and the right to dissociate, causing dissolution. In the case of a term partnership (i.e., a
partnership established for a definite term or for a specific purpose), a partner can still dissolve the firm
before the term expires by express action. However, such a dissolution is regarded as wrongful (the
partner has the power but not the right to dissociate) and subjects the wrongful dissolver to damages for
breach of the partnership agreement, and also results in certain limitations on his or her ability to
participate in the winding-up process. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 31(2) (1914). The remaining partners have the
right to continue business even if the partnership agreement does not so provide. In such a case,
however, they must either pay the withdrawing partner the fair value of her share in the partnership,
minus any damages caused by her breach of the agreement, or post a bond for that amount with the
court. KLEINBERGER, supra note 30, at 375, 378, 402-03.
48. This is the case of dissolution without business continuation. The dissolution of a
partnership terminates all authority of all partners to transact business on behalf of the firm except for
such business as is necessary to wind up the partnership. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 158.
49. The distributions are generally made in cash unless the partners agree otherwise. Id.
at 159.
50. If the other parties refuse to implement the buyout process, the partner might
request a judicial sale (i.e., a court-supervised sale). All partners are free to participate on that process
(absent bad faith or breach of fiduciary duty). See Prentiss v. Sheffel, 513 P.2d 949, 950 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1973). After the business liquidation, settling up follows sections 18(a) and 40 of UPA. UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT §§ 18(a), 40 (1914).
51. Under three situations, the business of the partnership may be continued post-
dissolution: (1) if the partnership has been wrongfully dissolved, the non-dissolving partners may elect
to buy out the dissolving partner and thereafter continue the business; (2) some of the partners may
purchase and use the partnership assets; and (3) the partnership agreement may provide for the business
to be continued without liquidation. Importantly, a provision authorizing continuation of the business
post-dissolution does not prevent the dissolution from occurring. Instead, a new partnership is formed to
which the assets of the old partnership are transferred and which assumes the liabilities of the old
partnership. This provision is structured as a buy-sell agreement, pursuant to which the interest of a
withdrawing partner is calculated and then paid. See KLEINBERGER, supra note 30, at 377.
52. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 601(3) (1997). Even if the other partners have the
right by agreement or statute to expel a partner, they remain subject to the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. However, courts have upheld as valid, for example, guillotine expulsion provisions under which
a partner may be expelled without cause and without any procedural due process. See Holman v. Coie,
522 P.2d 515 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
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expel a partner for purely business reasons . . . to protect relationships both
within the firm and with clients, [and] . . . in order to resolve a 'fundamental
schism' within the firm." For most dissociation grounds, the removal of the
dissociated partner does not trigger dissolution or winding up. The other partner
might buy out the dissociated partner's interest (or implement a process in
which each partner can buy out the other partner) and continue the business.54
In the case of dissociation originated by a partner's express will to withdraw,
however, the statutory rules mandate dissolution and the winding up of the
business.55 This default rule can be modified by a buy-sell agreement. Even in
the absence of such provisions, the partners may waive the right to have the
partnership's business dissolve and wound up by unanimous vote. 5 The
partnership must also be dissolved if an event occurs that is identified in the
partnership agreement as causing dissolution. 57 Finally, it must be dissolved if
all the partners agree. The RUPA's process for winding the business up in the
case of dissolution is similar to that under the UPA.
The process of dissociation and dissolution of LLCs under the ULLCA
are similar to those established under RUPA. An LLC member is dissociated
by withdrawal or expulsion of a member. Dissociation does not necessarily
lead to dissolution.59 If the business is to be continued without dissolution, the
53. 977 S.W.2d. 543, 546 (Tex. 1998). If the agreement contains such a provision, bad
faith is found only when there is "a wrongful withholding of money or property legally due to the
expelled partner at the time he is expelled." Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 443 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1990). As a result, as long as the other partners pay the partner to be expelled any sums due, they
are free to expel him without either good cause or even notice and hearing. Upon dissociation of a
partner, the dissociated partner's rights to participate in management of the firm terminate. The partner's
fiduciary obligation to refrain from competing with the partnership also terminates. Other statutory
fiduciary duties remain applicable only with respect to matters that arose before the disassociation or
those arising in connection with the winding up of the partnership. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §
603(b)(l)-(3) (1997).
54. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 701(a) (1997); see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 169
("[I]f the parties are unable to agree on the correct valuation of the dissociated partner's interest, the
dissociating partner may go to court for a judicial appraisal of the value of his interest.").
55. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 801(1) (1997). This default rule does not allow for
dissolution with business continuation.
56. In this case, a denial of dissolution clause might be valid. BAINBRIDGE, supra note
16, at 170.
57. Dissolution of a term partnership is triggered by the expiration of the specified term
or the completion of the specified project. Wrongful dissociation induces dissolution unless a majority
of the remaining partners agree to continue the partnership. Id. at 168.
58. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 601 (1996). The causes of dissociation in the ULLCA
and state statutes can be divided into voluntary and involuntary. As Professor Kleinberger explains,
these statutes (1) "recogniz[e], with regard to voluntary dissociation, that: -a member always has the
power to dissociate by expressing the intent to do so .. .; but -the operating agreement can constrain or
eliminate the right to dissociate (thereby making voluntary dissociation wrongful);" and (2) "provid[e]
some grounds for involuntary dissociation, such as: .. . expulsion: -by unanimous consent upon the
occurrence of specified grounds; or -as provided by the operating agreement." Although dissociation
terminates a member's right to participate in the firm's business, the dissociating member has the right
to participate in the winding-up process related to business dissolution. See KLEINBERGER, supra note
30, at 375, 585-86.
59. In contrast to the RUPA, under the ULLCA and LLC state statutes, the unilateral




dissociated member's interest must be purchased by the LLC or the other
members.60 The LLC must be dissolved and its business wound up upon the
occurrence of any event specified in the LLC operating agreement as triggering
dissolution. A vote of the members, as specified in the operating agreement,
can also require dissolution.
2. Asset Valuation
Asset valuation, which is necessary in order to complete the transfer of
assets, can be a very tricky matter for closely-held businesses. The value of a
partnership or an LLC may be intimately tied to the skills and knowledge of the
employees, to the business methods and corporate culture of the organization,
or to its intellectual property. These sources and drivers of value are often
intangible; they are not necessarily reflected in the financial statements or other
business documents. In these circumstances, the most accurate information
about the value of the business venture may reside in the minds of the business
owners themselves. The inclusion of buy-sell clauses, such as Shotgun
provisions, in the ex ante business agreements facilitates the valuation of assets
and hence the completion of the dissociation and dissolution processes.
The next Section discusses Shotgun provisions and alternative valuation
methods including auctions and external appraisal.
B. Shotgun Provisions6 1
Under a Shotgun provision, one owner names a single buy-sell price and
the other owner is compelled to either buy or sell shares at that named price.
One typical example is found in the operating agreement of the Omnibus
Financial Group:
If for any reason any Member ('the Electing Member') is unwilling to continue
to be a member of [Omnibus] if another Member ('the Notified Member') is also
a member of [Omnibus], then the Electing Member may give the Notified
Member written notice stating in such notice the value of a 1% Membership
Interest ('Interest Value') whereupon the Notified Member shall, by written
notice given to the Electing Member within 30 days from the date of receipt of
the Electing Member's notice, elect either to purchase the Electing Member's
provide a corporate-like stability on the LLC by making it more difficult for a member to induce
dissolution and winding up. See REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 801(1) (1997); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT
§ 601 (1996); KLEINBERGER, supra note 30, at 585.
60. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 701 (1996). If they are unable to agree to a price, a
judicial appraisal proceeding is available. Id. § 702.
61. Our analysis involves numerical examples. The formal models and solutions are
presented in the Appendix.
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interest in [Omnibus] or to sell to the Electing Member the Notified Member's
interest in [Omnibus].
6 2
We first study the core properties of the Shotgun provisions under a sim-
ple scenario characterized by the absence of asymmetries between the business
owners (the benchmark environment). We then enrich our analysis by incorpo-
rating various empirically-relevant asymmetries. As we will see, asymmetries
can lead to unwanted strategic behavior and inequitable outcomes. We discuss
how private contracts might be structured to mitigate these adverse effects.
1. Benchmark Environment: Symmetric Information
Suppose that two business owners63 with equal stakes6 in the company
are deadlocked: irreconcilable differences in opinion, vision, personality, or
other factors, and the absence of a majority vote or unanimity is preventing the
company from maintaining its operational effectiveness. If the parties remain in
the deadlocked situation, the value of the business assets is $400; if, on the
other hand, one party were to purchase the stake of the other, the overall value
of the company would increase to $500. Thus, the deadlock is inefficient and is
causing a real economic loss of $100. In our benchmark scenario, we assume
that the two owners know the value of the business assets, that the owners are
not financially constrained and have the resources to purchase the stake of the
other, that they are equally capable of running the company alone, and that the
66owners are concerned only about maximizing their monetary payoffs. These
assumptions will all be relaxed later. We finally assume that there are no
outside bidders interested in acquiring the company's assets, an assumption that
renders liquidation on the open market impractical.
In this scenario, the Shotgun provision, if activated, would lead to an
equal division of value between the owners. The offeror would find it in his or
her self-interest to make a buy-sell offer of $250 and the offeree would be
62. Valinote v. Ballis, No. 00 C 3089, 2001 WL 1135871, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25,
2001) (quoting section 10.B of the Omnibus Financial Group's operating agreement).
63. Our analysis also holds in the case of two groups of owners, with each group
encompassing one or more members. In cases involving more than two owners and more than two
groups, there might not be perfect division. Steven J. Brains, Michael A. Jones & Christina Klamler, N-
Person Cake-Cutting: There May Be No Perfect Division, 120 AM. MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY 35
(2013). Importantly, 80% of all joint ventures incorporated in the U.S. between 1985 and 2000 are two-
partner joint ventures. Robert Hauswald & Ulrich Hege, Ownership and Control in Joint Ventures:
Theory and Evidence (AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings, 2003), http://ssm.com/abstract-302924. Hence,
our study is empirically relevant.
64. For a more general analysis of ownership allocation, see Brooks, Landeo & Spier,
supra note 16.
65. The values used in this numerical example are expressed in millions.
66. These assumptions are aligned with the Model Real Estate Development Operating
Agreement, which presumes "that all of the members have the information, access to capital, general
capability and inclination to bid for the interest or interests of the other member or members." Model




indifferent between selling and buying at this price.67 In equilibrium, the two
parties split the $500 asset value equally, with each party getting $250. The
offeror cannot do better than offering $250. If he offered $225 instead, the
recipient would surely buy since the recipient would net $500 - $225 = $275
by buying. This would give the offeror a payoff of $225, which is less than
before. If the offeror offered $275, the recipient would surely sell, giving the
offeror a payoff of $500 - $275 = $225, which again is less than before. Thus,
the offeror proposes $250. The Shotgun clause therefore implements a fair,
cost-efficient, and expedient division of the business assets.
In the absence of a well-specified deadlock resolution mechanism, a fair
(equitable) and expedient division of the assets may be elusive. The parties
would resort to either decentralized bargaining in the backdrop of either the
continuation of the deadlock or a potential judicial resolution of the deadlock.
Under the assumption of symmetric information between the parties, and
assuming away other barriers to negotiation, it is likely that Coasian bargaining
will prevail and the parties would agree for one party to buy out the other.
When the backdrop option is inefficient, and the gains from trade are large,
then the range of potential bargaining outcomes is broad. As a consequence, the
terms of the negotiated deal may not be equitable.
In this scenario, when bargaining in the shadow of a continued deadlock,
the least a party would be willing to accept for his or her stake is $200 (half the
value of the deadlocked company). But what is the most that a party would be
willing to pay for the stake of the other party? If a party achieved sole control
of the company, he or she would receive profits with a present discounted value
of $500. So the most that a party would be willing to pay for the other party's
stake is $500 - $200 = $300. The bargaining zone, which is the range between
the least a party is willing to accept for his stake and the most he is willing to
pay for full control of the company, is between $200 and $300. If the parties
were bargaining in the shadow of remaining in the inefficient deadlock, then
the decentralized negotiations could end up anywhere in this range.
67. If the offeree decides to sell his stake, he will receive the $250 price; if the offeree
instead decides to buy the offeror's stake, he will pay the $250 price and become the sole owner of the
firm with business assets with value of $500. Note that the offeror is indifferent between the offeree
selling and buying at the $250 price as well.
68. Shotgun clauses also have desirable properties when the owners have unequal
equity stakes, but are otherwise symmetric in their information, financial resources, and capabilities.
Suppose that there are 100 shares of stock, and that one party owns 99 shares and the other party owns 1
share. They are nevertheless in a deadlock where the ongoing total value is $400 if they continue under
the arrangement but $500 if one party buys out the other. A fair solution would be for the company to
dissolve and for the larger and smaller owners to receive value of $495 and $5, respectively. The
Shotgun clause would specify that the buy-sell offer is per share of the stock, rather than for a 50%
ownership stake as described in the text. See Baldwin v. Miller, No. 04-72919, 2008 WL 2278620
(Bankr. E.D. Okla. May 30, 2008) (having the features discussed here).
69. R.H. Coase argued that in the absence of transaction costs, the initial allocation of
property rights is not important. Through private bargaining, assets will be allocated to their highest
value use. R.H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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Now suppose that the business agreement has a Shotgun provision that,
like the provision included in the operating agreement of the Omnibus
Financial Group,70 serves as an outside option for negotiations. In contrast to
the outside option of continued deadlock, which created a large bargaining
range as described above, the Shotgun provision creates a clear and efficient
default option for the two parties, effectively shrinking the bargaining range.
Neither party would be willing to accept a negotiated deal that gave less than
their fair share of the company. A party would not be willing to sell his stake in
the company for less than $250, what he would get by triggering the Shotgun
clause. Similarly, a party would not be willing to pay more than $250. Thus,
when used as a backdrop option, the Shotgun clause shrinks the bargaining
range to a single point, $250.
In sum, when the parties are symmetrically informed about the value of
the company, have adequate financial resources, and have comparable
capabilities, the Shotgun provision is a fair, expedient, and cost-efficient means
of achieving a buyout. Moreover, the Shotgun provision has desirable
properties as an outside option; it creates a narrower bargaining range than the
outside options of continued deadlock or inefficient liquidation, and thus
greater predictability for the parties in their private dealings.
2. Asymmetric Information
The equitable resolution of deadlocks may be elusive when the owners are
asymmetrically informed about the value of the company. Suppose that one
party is able to better predict the future value of the company than the other
party. The better-informed party may be the managing partner who is engaged
in the day-to-day management of the company, for example, while the lesser-
informed partner may be supplying the financial capital.72 More specifically,
suppose that there is a 75% chance that the ongoing value of the company
under sole ownership is $250, which is of course substantially less than the rosy
projection of $500, which happens with 25% likelihood. If the parties remain
deadlocked, then the ongoing value is $150 (with a 75% chance) or $400 (with
a 25% chance), so the loss from continuing in the deadlock is $100 as before.
70. Valinote v. Ballis, No. 00 C 3089, 2001 WL 1135871, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25,
2001).
71. The two owners have common or affiliated values since the information in hands of
the better-informed party is directly relevant for the future payoff of the uninformed owner if the
uninformed owner were to maintain an ownership stake in the company. This may be contrasted with a
situation where the parties have independent private values. Note that our analysis might also apply to
cases in which both parties might have better information about different aspects of the business, if only
one party's information is relevant to the assessment of the value of the business assets. Finally, note
that our analysis is not applicable to environments in which both parties hold relevant private
information for the determination of the value of the business assets, i.e., two-sided asymmetric
information environments.
72. In general, these asymmetries are exacerbated in organizations in which the




We will assume that the less-informed party, Owner 2, doesn't know which
scenario applies (although he is sophisticated enough to realize that both
scenarios are possible). The better-informed party, Owner 1, knows which of
the two possibilities is the true state of affairs.
Owner 2, who is less informed about the continuation value of the
company, is at a significant disadvantage when making a buy-sell offer. When
making a buy-sell offer, Owner 2 is taking a "shot in the dark." Suppose that
Owner 2 makes an offer of $250 under the Shotgun provision.73 In the best-case
scenario, where the assets are worth $500 (or $250 for each owner), then
Owner 1, the fully informed offeree, would be indifferent between buying and
selling and both owners would ultimately walk away with payoffs of $250.
This is an equitable outcome.
In the alternative scenario, where the assets are really worth $250 (or $125
for each owner), then Owner 1 (the offeree) would surely decide to sell his
stake to Owner 2. Owner 1 would receive the $250 selling price, and Owner 2
would net nothing because he will become the sole owner of a business with a
value of $250 by transferring $250 to Owner 1 (for assets with value equal to
$125 only), i.e., Owner 2 will get a net payoff of zero ($250 - $250 = $0),
while Owner 1 will get a net payoff of $250. This is an inequitable outcome.74
Owner 2 could instead propose a buy-sell price of $125. This would
certainly protect Owner 2 when the assets are worth a total of $250. In this
case, Owner 2 would receive a payoff equal to $125. But Owner 2 will receive
far less than his fair share in the (less likely) scenario where the assets are
worth $500 (since the better informed Owner 1 will opt to buy in this case).
Specifically, Owner 2 will receive a payoff equal to $125 and Owner I will
receive a payoff equal to $500 - $125 = $375, an inequitable outcome.
Table 1: The Shotgun Mechanism with Asymmetric Information
Offeror Assets Buy-Sell Allocation of Assets
Value Offer Owner 1 Owner 2
Owner 1 $250 $125 50% 50%
(Informed Owner) $500 $250 50% 50%
Owner 2 $250 $125 50% 50%
(Uninformed Owner) $500 $125 75% 25%
73. Note that this is the same offer that was made in the simple setting where there was
no doubt as to the value of the assets.
74. Given that there is a 75% chance that the business assets will have a value equal to
$250, and a 25% chance that the business assets will have a value equal to $500, then Owner 2 will
receive on average .75 ($0) + .25 ($250) = $62.5.
75. Given that the payoff for Owner 2 from offering a price equal to $125 (a payoff
equal to $125) is higher than the average payoff he could receive by offering a price equal to $500 (a
payoff equal to $62.5), we might expect that a rational Owner 2 would offer the low price. Please see the
Appendix for technical details.
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Owner 2 would do much better if the better-informed Owner 1 made the
buy-sell offer instead. Indeed, in our example, the equitable outcome would be
obtained in this case. To see how this would work, suppose that Owner 1 offers
$250 when the assets have the high value and $125 when they have the low
value. In other words, imagine that Owner 1 is telling the truth. In this scenario,
Owner 2 doesn't directly observe the value of the assets but rationally expects
that Owner 1 is proposing a price that is accurately aligned with the true value
of the assets. When he receives an offer of $250, for example, Owner 2
believes that the assets have high value, and given this belief Owner 2 is
indifferent between selling and buying. When he receives an offer of $125,
Owner 2 believes that the assets have low value and is similarly indifferent
between buying and selling. It is a toss-up from Owner 2's perspective, and
Owner 2 may rationally either buy or sell shares. The possibility that the better-
informed Owner 1 could end up on either end of the deal is what keeps Owner
1 honest and creates no incentive to misrepresent the value of the company.76
Table 1 summarizes the possible outcomes under the Shotgun mechanism and
asymmetric information.
The preceding analysis has interesting and relevant implications. First,
with asymmetric information, a more equitable allocation will be achieved
when the informed party makes the offer. Second, our analysis suggests each of
the two parties will prefer that the other party be the one to make the buy-sell
offer. Absent provisions that mandate the role of the offeror, the two parties
may end up in a standoff where each party wants the other to pull the trigger.
They might be "gun shy."n Interestingly, this implication is consistent with
what is observed in practice: despite their widespread adoption, it is relatively
rare for Shotgun provisions to be triggered.
76. Uninformed partners are also typically protected by the duty of loyalty. In fact, the
obligation to disclose material facts is part of the duty of loyalty when there is a conflict of interest.
Specifically, when a partner has a conflict of interest related to a specific transaction, the partner must
disclose her interest and any other material facts that might affect the value of the transaction. Blue Chip
Emerald LLC v. Allied Partners, Inc. provides an illustration. 750 N.Y.S. 2d 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
In this case, following a buyout, the purchasing member turned around and sold the company for 250%
of the stated valuation. The court held the purchasing member to be a fiduciary of the selling member,
and therefore, obligated to disclose and not misrepresent the material value of the company. Id. at 295.
Following the UPA, courts did not generally recognize a duty of disclosure absent a conflict of interest.
See Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986 (D.D.C. 1975); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 147
("UPA (1914) § 20 limited intra-partnership disclosure duties (other than access to the books) to
situations in which a partner made demand for information of all things affecting the partnership. In
contrast, [R]UPA § 403(c)(1) imposes a duty to disclose, without demand, any information concerning
the partnership's business and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights
and duties.").
77. For a theoretical and experimental analysis of the standoff problem, see Landeo &
Spier, supra note 14.
78. The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) conducted a
survey among its members and all thirty-three respondents included Shotgun provisions in their business
agreements, although 82% of them indicated that these clauses were rarely or never triggered. Public




Contracting parties should be aware of the problems caused by
asymmetric information and take ex ante steps to mitigate them. If the parties
can anticipate at the time of drafting their business agreement which of the two
owners will have better information, then they might want to specify that the
better informed party will be the offeror. Some of the circumstances, such as
the practical withdrawal of one of the business owners, may be foreseeable.79
The parties might also include a claw-back or earn-out provision in their
contract as an added protection against opportunism. These clauses would
assure the selling member additional compensation if the company were later
sold for a premium over the buy-sell price. The incorporation of a material
adverse effect (MAE) or a material adverse change (MAC) clause in the
business agreement, under which the better-informed partner has the obligation
to notify the less-informed member of events that materially reduce the firm
value, might also be beneficial.o
3. Other Asymmetries
We discuss now the implementation of Shotgun mechanisms under
asymmetric financial resources, asymmetric capabilities, and non-monetary
preferences.
i. Asymmetric Financial Resources
Shotgun provisions should be adopted with caution when owners do not
have equal financial capabilities. Following our original example, suppose that
the value of the company under a continued deadlock is $400 and that the value
increases to $500 when one party buys out the other party. Suppose that one
party, Owner 1, has very deep pockets and could easily afford to purchase
Owner 2's stake. 81 Owner I may have the advantage of having accumulated
significant personal wealth or easy access to other sources of capital from
outside associates and lenders. Owner 2, on the other hand, is financially
constrained. The Shotgun provision puts Owner 2 in a very vulnerable position.
If Owner 1 were to activate the clause and propose a very low buy-sell price,
Chairman of Emerging Issues Task Force, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. (October 22, 2007) (on file
with authors). The rare initiation of the buy-sell procedure under Shotgun clauses might also be
explained by the parties' choice of simple buy or simple sell offers as exit mechanisms. Professors
Brooks, Landeo and Spier present theoretical analysis and experimental evidence regarding the
incentives of the parties to choose simple buy or simple sell offers in non-mandatory Shotgun
environments. Brooks, Landeo & Spier, supra note 14.
79. These circumstances will often change the relative capabilities of the parties as
well, an issue that will be discussed in the next Subsection.
80. For a recent case involving a MAC provision, see Metro Conmc'ns Corp. BVI v.
Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121 (Del. Ch. 2004).
81. If the proposed price is above $250, then Owner I would of course prefer to sell his
stake to Owner 2 at this price.
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82
such as $10, then Owner 2 may well end up in a financial bind. Although
Owner 2 would surely want to buy out Owner l's stake at this price, and would
net a whopping $500 - $10 = $490 by doing so, Owner 2 may be unable to
raise the necessary capital to finance the purchase. Thus, the liquidity
constraints faced by one owner create an opportunity for the better-situated
owner to acquire the assets at a predatory price.84
There are several contractual and legal protections from the problem of
asymmetric financial resources. First, business agreements can be designed to
give the receiver sufficient time to arrange for financing and attend to other
administrative matters. In addition, business agreements may explicitly allow
for buyouts to be funded over time, so the acquiring member effectively
provides the financing for the departing member.85 Indeed, there are companies
that help entrepreneurs react quickly to an executed Shotgun clause (i.e.,
venture capital firms that provide funds for this purpose).86 Second, it is not
uncommon for the financially disadvantaged party to claim that the other
violated duties of loyalty, good faith dealing, and fiduciary responsibilities, and
courts may be sympathetic towards these types of complaints.87
82. Financial advisors warn shareholders about the advantage of the party with the
"deeper pockets" under Shotgun clauses. See John Warrillow, Ugly Downside of a Shotgun Business
Partnership, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Sept. 6, 2012, 4:02 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report
-on-business/small-business/sb-money/valuation/ugly-downside-of-a-shotgun-businesspartnership/articl
e626688.
83. Note that the financially-constrained owner might avoid being taken advantage of if
he acts first and triggers the Shotgun provision by making a buy-sell offer to the other party for $249. At
this price, the financially-liquid offeree would surely prefer to buy the offeror's stake and net $500 -
$249 = $251 than to sell his own stake for $249. Note that if the offeree opted to sell his stake for $249,
the financially constrained offeror will not be able to raise the funds necessary to finance the purchase
and may need to breach the contract. Including language in the contract that would nullify the breaching
party's buy-sell offer could solve this problem. For recommended language, see Model Real Estate
Development Operating Agreement, supra note 18, at 272-78. Alternatively, the contract would be
giving the non-breaching member the option to purchase the breaching member's stake at a significantly
reduced price. For an example of a 10% "haircut," see Eureka VIIILLC v. Niagara Falls Holdings LLC,
899 A.2d 95, 103 (Del. Ch. 2006), aff'd, 918 A.2d 1171 (Del. 2007).
84. See, e.g., Fredric D. Tannenbaum, What Every Business Lawyer and Business
Owner Should Know About Buy-Sell Agreements Pt. 2, 145 PRAc. LAW. 55, 65 (1999) ("Theoretically,
the offeree's right to buy out the offeror at the same price offered by the offeror will incite the offeror to
quote a fair price, for fear that if the price is too low, the offeror will be bought out at that price. In
reality, however, the offeror and offeree do not always have the same financial resources, and the
offeree's rights to match a low offer by the offeror may be illusory."); see also Wayne M. Gazur, The
Forgotten Link: "Control" in Section 482, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 45 n.170 (1994); John
Goodgame, When Getting Out Is Hard to Do, 14 Bus. L. TODAY 31, 36 (May/June 2005); Jason M.
Hoberman, Practical Considerations for Drafting and Utilizing Deadlock Solutions for Non-Corporate
Business Entities, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 231, 244-45 (2001).
85. See Stephanie Clifford, How to Write a Buy-Sell Agreement, INC. MAG. (Nov. 1,
2006), http://www.inc.com/magazine/20061 101/partnership-buy-sell.html.
86. One such company, the Shotgun Fund, specializes in these types of deals. See
SHOTGUN FUND, supra note 21.
87. But see D'Angelo v. Leone, No. 2005/09815, 2007 BL 241725, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 13, 2007) ("The parties did not negotiate terms to protect the less wealthy shareholder, and the
court cannot now supply them."). There, the buy-sell deadlock provision was upheld, despite wealth
differences. In Denn v. Anderson, the appeals court found that the lower court had erred in its finding of




When the two parties are not equally capable of running the company,
Shotgun provisions may lead to inequitable divisions of value.8 Let's return to
our original example where the parties are symmetrically informed about the
value of the company's assets, and assume that the value of the company under
a continued deadlock is $400. Owner 1 is the more capable manager, and if
Owner 1 assumed full ownership of the company, then the value of the
company would rise to $500. By contrast, Owner 2 is less capable and the value
of the company under Owner 2's control is no higher than the value under
deadlock, i.e., $400.
Suppose that Owner 1, the more capable party, triggers the Shotgun
provision and makes a buy-sell offer. The most profitable offer that Owner 1
could make is just over $200, say $201. Offered this price, the less-capable
Owner 2 would choose to sell his stake, since the $201 sale price exceeds the
net value from buying out Owner 1 (since $400 - $201 = $199). So Owner I
would receive a net payoff of $299 and Owner 2 would receive $201. A more
equitable outcome would be obtained if Owner 2, the less capable party, makes
the buy-sell offer. Owner 2 would offer just under $250, say $249, and Owner
1 will decide to purchase Owner 2's stake. Owner l's net payoff is $251, and
Owner 2's payoff is $249.89
This analysis raises several implications. First, when one partner or
member has stronger capabilities than the other, the terms of trade from the
buyout may be inequitable. 90 Second, in contrast to the case of asymmetric
information, where the parties were "gun shy," each preferring the other to
activate the Shotgun provision, in this new setting the parties are "trigger
happy." The more capable party receives a higher net payoff if he is the one to
trigger the clause, $299 versus $251. Conversely, the less capable party
receives a higher payoff if he is the one to pull the trigger, $249 versus $201.
The owners could take ex ante steps in their business agreements to
protect against the type of opportunism that might arise in these environments.
88. The allocation of managerial roles in the organization might be an important source
of asymmetric capabilities. Specifically, if the business is managed just by one of the owners, she might
develop stronger capabilities to create value than the other owners.
89. See Ledford v. Peeples, 657 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2011). In Ledford, the Shotgun
provision was triggered by the more capable member who also had access to better financing. Id. at
1225.
90. The implication that an equitable outcome is obtained when the less capable owner
initiates the Shotgun provision may be in conflict with our earlier result that the better-informed party
should be the one to make the offer. After all, in practice, the more capable owner may also have better
information about the future business prospects, i.e., the environment might involve asymmetric
capabilities and asymmetric information. See Brooks, Landeo & Spier, supra note 14 (demonstrating
that the uninformed and less capable owner will never make a voluntary buy-sell offer in this
environment; she will instead prefer to make a simple sell offer to sell her stake to the other owner).
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In the case of foreseeable sources of asymmetric capabilities, the role of offeror
could be assigned ex ante to the less capable owner.91
iii. Non-Monetary Preferences
The advantages of Shotgun clauses may be even larger when deadlocked
parties have non-monetary preferences. Our benchmark example presumed that
the two owners were motivated by money, with each party wanting to extract as
much of the monetary value of the company for himself as possible.92 The
parties were not altruistic, since they did not derive any utility from the
monetary value captured by the other party. Nor were the parties spiteful, since
they did not derive any personal non-pecuniary benefit from harming the
position of the other party.
Suppose that over the course of the decline of their relationship and
resulting deadlock, the two parties have developed spiteful preferences: each
party is willing to sacrifice his own monetary gain in order to prevent the other
party from enjoying any monetary benefit. If both parties have such
preferences, then deadlocks could persist despite the opportunities for
negotiation. Both parties might prefer to remain in the deadlock, receiving $200
each, to a financially-superior arrangement where they each receive monetary
payoffs of $250. If both parties have spiteful preferences, then the business
deadlock would persist even with a Shotgun clause, since neither party would
be willing to trigger it.
Assume now that just one of the two parties, Owner 1, has strong spiteful
preferences. Specifically, assume that Owner 1 prefers remaining in the
deadlock to buying Owner 2's stake for $201 or to selling his own stake for
$299." Owner 2, on the other hand, has traditional preferences. In the absence
of a Shotgun clause or other deadlock resolution mechanism, the parties will
remain deadlocked. There is no scope for an agreement between the parties,
since Owner 1 would not agree to a deal that enhances the monetary position of
Owner 2. In other words, bilateral negotiations to end the deadlock are destined
to fail.
A Shotgun clause gives Owner 2 a mechanism for unilaterally ending the
deadlock, since it effectively removes the status quo of continued joint
91. Cases involving both asymmetric capabilities and information can pose particular
challenges, especially when the less-informed owner is also less capable. It may be advisable to adopt
and clarify other mechanisms for deadlock resolution when drafting the business agreement. See the
earlier discussion of clawback and eamout provisions, and MAE and MAC clauses, supra Subsection
II.B.2.
92. The previous extensions were also developed under this assumption.
93. Note that in each of these two scenarios, Owner I receives a monetary payoff of
$299 and Owner 2 receives $201. By assumption, Owner 1 is spiteful and prefers to sacrifice his own




ownership from the bargaining table.94 Owner 1 is forced either to sell his stake
or to buy the other party's stake, and in both cases Owners I and 2 get financial
payoffs of $250. Owner 1 is spiteful, of course, and would prefer the status quo
of continued value destruction where they each receive payoffs of $200, but
this option is not available once the Shotgun provision has been triggered. So in
equilibrium, Owner 2 would propose a buy-sell offer of $250 and the financial
value of the firm would be divided evenly between the two owners.
C. Alternative Provisions
1. Auctions
Business agreements might specify that, in the event of a deadlock, the
owners should implement an auction to determine which party will buy out the
other.95 Suppose the parties are compelled to participate in a sealed-bid auction,
where the party who submits the highest bid purchases the asset from the other
party, and pays a price equal to his own bid.96 The "winner" of the auction is
the buyer and the "loser" of the auction is the seller.
We will show that, when the two parties are both fully informed about the
value of their joint assets, are financially motivated, and have equal access to
capital, then a private auction of the assets (with just the two owners bidding)
will lead to an equitable division of the company's value. Indeed, the auction
mechanism leads to the same outcome as a Shotgun procedure in this case.
When one party has better information about the value of the assets than the
other party, or other asymmetries are present, this equivalence no longer holds.
94. In Decker v. Decker, the two Decker brothers (Frederick and David) formed a real
estate LLC. 726 N.W.2d 664 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). Frederick wanted to dissolve the LLC, and David
wanted it to continue. "Frederick, who the record suggests apparently harbors some animosity towards
his brother, insists that the properties must all be sold to third parties on the open market, therefore
creating considerable costs, including real estate commissions, tax consequences and the like, to both."
Id. at 670. Their operating agreement included a buy-sell clause, which Frederick sabotaged by making a
grossly inflated buy-sell offer which was almost three times the value of David's stake. Id. at 666. As
Frederick apparently anticipated, David agreed to sell at that price. Id. Frederick subsequently refused to
follow through and buy out David. Id. The trial court eventually ordered Frederick to sell his stake to
David at fair market value, commenting, "The only thing I can't give [Frederick] which he seems to
dearly want is to intentionally cause further harm to his brother." Id. at 671 (quoting the trial court).
95. For instance, in Monin v. Monin, the two Monin brothers agreed to a private first-
price auction (coupled with a covenant not to compete). 785 S.W.2d 499 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989). In a
private first-price auction, only the two 50-50 owners submit bids to buy the other party's shares of the
business assets, and the highest bidder ("the winner") buys the other owner's assets at the winner's
proposed price. In Lola Cars International., Ltd. v. Krohn Racing, LLC, on the other hand, the parties
included a Dutch auction (sometimes known as a Mexican Shoot Out) in their business agreement. C.A.
Nos. 4479-VCN, 4886-VCN, 2011 WL 567458 (Del. Ch. Feb. 08, 2011). In this mechanism, the parties
submit sealed bids indicating the minimum price for which they would be willing to sell their 50% share
of the business assets. The highest bidder wins and buys the other party's assets ("the loser") at the price
indicated by the lowest bidder.
96. This type of auction is called a first-price sealed-bid auction. Paul R. Milgrom &
Robert T. Weber, A Theory ofAuctions and Competitive Bidding, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1089 (1982).
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With asymmetries, the Shotgun mechanism may well outperform a standard
auction.97
i. Symmetric Information
Suppose that the value of the assets is $500 and both parties know that it
is worth $500. Since both parties understand that the asset value is $500, then
the selling price will be bid up to $250 but no more. Neither party would be
willing to raise his bid to $251. It is easy to see why: a party would rather lose
the auction and receive $250 as a seller than win the auction and pay $251 for
an asset worth $500 (since the latter strategy would net the winner of the
auction $249). So, the parties will bid the price up to $250 and no further, either
party might become the sole owner, and the value of the asset will be split
evenly between them. The same logic can be applied to show that when
business assets equal $250, the parties will equally split the assets by bidding
up to $125 but no more.
ii. Asymmetric Information
The equivalence between the Shotgun mechanism and the auction no
longer holds when the parties are not fully informed about the value of the
underlying asset. One party, the managing owner perhaps, may have a more
accurate estimate of the future income from the assets or the viability of the
business model. Such asymmetries of information can lead to very unequal
outcomes for the two parties and, in particular, will put the less-informed party
at a strategic disadvantage in the auction setting.
Equitable division of the business assets would require that the winning
bid equals $125 when the value of the assets is low ($250) and the winning bid
equals $250 when the value of the assets is high ($500). Suppose that the
better-informed party was in fact willing to place these fair and equitable bids
in the sealed-bid auction. Anticipating this, what bid would the less-informed
party make? It is easy to see that the less-informed party would be very
reluctant to offer anything above $125 in this scenario. If he were to bid a
somewhat higher amount, $130 say, then he would win the auction and
purchase shares when the asset value was low ($250), but his net payoff would
be $250 - $130 = $120 < $125. By raising his offer to $250, the less-informed
player would do even worse (since his net payoff would be zero if the assets
were worth $250). Now, if the better-informed party anticipated that the less-
informed party would place a bid of no more than $125, then the better-
informed party would strategically reduce his bid below $250 when the asset
97. The Shotgun mechanism can be interpreted as a special type of auction where one
party places the first bid, which is revealed to the second party, who then may place a second bid. The





value is high. Why would the better-informed party want to bid $250 if the
less-informed party is bidding $125? Therefore, an equitable division of the
business assets cannot be obtained in the auction.98
The playing field is clearly not level when the parties are asymmetrically
informed about the value of the business assets. The well-informed party can
fine-tune his bid to the true value of the underlying asset while the less-
informed party cannot. This puts the better-informed party at a strategic
advantage in the sealed-bid auction. On average, the party with the better
information will receive a higher payoff in the auction.
iii. Other Asymmetries
The standard auction mechanism also leads to inequitable outcomes when
the parties have asymmetric capabilities or access to financial resources.
Following the example from the last Subsection, suppose that the business
assets in the hands of the more capable party have a value equal to $500, while
the assets in the hands of the less capable party have a value equal to $400. In
an auction, the less capable party would bid up to $200, and the more capable
party would win the auction and purchase the assets for $201. The more
capable party comes out ahead here, with a payoff of $299 compared to the less
capable party's payoff of $201. Similarly, if one party is financially
constrained, then the financially stronger party may acquire the assets at a
bargain price.
2. External Appraisal
Business agreements might give deadlocked owners the option to buy the
stakes of other owners, or sell their own stakes to the other owners,99 at a price
that is set by an external appraiser. 00 Using external appraisers to determine
98. One can show that the bidding strategies in this common-value auction will involve
a degree of randomization by both of the parties. The better-informed party will offer $125 when the
asset value is low, but will randomize over a range of prices when the asset value is high. The less-
informed party will always randomize over a range of prices.
99. For an example of a call right, or the option to purchase the stake of another
member, see Cobble Hill Nursing Home, Inc. v. Henry & Warren Corp., 601 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993). For an example of a "put right," i.e., an option for a dissociating member to sell his or her
share back to the company, see Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2009 WL 73957 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 13, 2009).
100. The price could also be set by using a predetermined formula. Sections 701(b) and
(c) of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act provide the default rule for determining the
buyout price. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 701(b)-(c) (2006). The predetermined formulas are
sometimes based on the book value of the partnership or LLC, or based on other accounting measures of
performance. While formulas have the practical advantage of being unambiguous, they may not reflect
the true underlying fundamentals of the business and may be out of alignment with the economic reality
of the marketplace. Real estate, for example, is typically included on the balance sheet at its historical
value, rather than its market value. See, e.g., CLYDE P. STICKNEY ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: AN
INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS, METHODS AND USES 110 (13th ed. 2009). Other economic assets, such as
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market value may be problematic as well. First, appraisals can be very
expensive, especially if appraising the assets requires specialized business
knowledge. Second, the contracting parties may disagree about the appropriate
choice of the appraiser. 01 Finally, and very importantly, the appraisers may be
at an informational disadvantage relative to the members themselves at placing
a value on the assets. In specialized closely-held business organizations, much
of the value of the business is closely tied to the expertise of the partners, and
outside markets for these organizations are often thin or non-existent. So, in
many situations, the partners are themselves in the best position to determine
the value of their business organization.102
D. Discussion
Our analysis of private resolution of deadlocks indicates that, in the
absence of asymmetries, both Shotgun mechanisms and private auctions will
lead to fair and equitable outcomes. Auctions may create additional delay and
costs, however, since they often require the services of third-party auctioneers.
Although external appraisal methods might generate fair outcomes, these
methods involve unnecessary administrative costs (cost inefficiencies) and
delays (non-expedient procedures). Importantly, under asymmetries, only the
Shotgun mechanism might preserve these three properties. Table 2 summarizes
our assessment of the properties of the Shotgun, auction, and external appraisal
provisions.
the business methods of the company and their relationships with employees, customers, and suppliers,
may not be counted as assets under standard accounting principles. Id. at 109-10.
101. It is therefore advisable for the contract to specify either who the appraiser will be,
or an unambiguous procedure for selecting appraisers.
102. Courts have recognized this problem. See, e.g., Gilvesy Enterprises Inc. v. R.,
(1996) [1997] 1 C.T.C. 2410, para. 24 (Can. Tax Ct.) ("Faced with a choice between the highly
theoretical opinion of [the outside appraiser], and the real transaction between these two very
experienced business men, knowledgeable about the company and the industry, dealing in the real world




Table 2: Deadlock Provisions, Asymmetries, and Outcome Characteristics
Provision Asymmetries Fairness Expediency Cost-Efficiency
Shotgun No Yes Yes Yes
Auction No Yes Uncertain Uncertain
Appraisal No Uncertain No No
Shotgun Yes Uncertain Yes Yes
Auction Yes No Uncertain Uncertain
Appraisal Yes Uncertain No No
We have demonstrated that the Shotgun mechanism has the potential to
level the playing field and facilitate a more equitable division of value for the
parties under asymmetric information. Specifically, when the better informed
of the two parties is compelled to make a buy-sell offer, the allocation of the
assets is equitable. The informed party offers $125 when the asset value is low
and offers $250 when the asset value is high. The less-informed party buys
when the buy-sell offer is low, and sells if the buy-sell offer is high, and the
surplus is divided evenly. It should be noted that this equitable outcome is not
obtained with the Shotgun mechanism when the less-informed party is
compelled to make a buy-sell offer. In that case, the well-informed recipient
would choose to buy if the assets were underpriced by the offeror, and would
sell if the assets were overpriced. Unlike the auction mechanism under
asymmetric information, the Shotgun procedure may well achieve an equitable
outcome when it is administered appropriately.
Finally, we have shown that the Shotgun mechanism also has the potential
to produce equitable results when there are asymmetric financial resources or
capabilities. As described earlier, equitable outcomes can be achieved when the
less capable owner makes a buy-sell offer and sufficient time is provided to
arrange for financing of the buy-sell operations.
III. Judicial Resolution with Shotgun Mechanisms
This Part discusses the judicial resolution of business deadlock, including
the judicially-mandated dissociation of a joint owner and dissolution of the
business entity.10 3 Judicial involvement may arise in situations where the
business owners did not include a buy-sell mechanism in their business
agreement ex ante. 104 It may also arise when a deadlock clause was included in
103. Judicial intervention might also involve judicial appraisal or judicial sale under
court supervision. See supra Section II.A for a discussion of dissociation and dissolution.
104. See, e.g., Vila v. BVWebTies LLC, No. 4308-VCS, 2010 WL 3866098 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 1, 2010).
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the business agreement but the grounds for dissociation or dissolution are not
clear. In both situations, the court may be called on to determine whether
dissociation or dissolution is justifiable and to determine the appropriate
remedy and asset valuation procedure.
We argue that Shotgun mechanisms in the judicial context exhibit the
same desirable properties as they did for private contracting: fairness,
expediency, and cost-efficiency. Moreover, we claim that the risks associated
with misuse are likely to be less severe in the judicial context because of the ex
post implementation of the Shotgun mechanism. With the power of hindsight,
courts might have enough information to optimally tailor the design of Shotgun
mechanisms to the specific circumstances surrounding the case.
A. General Aspects
Section 32 of UPA identifies the circumstances upon which a court may
order a partnership dissolved. A court may order dissolution of the partnership
on a number of grounds associated with business deadlock. These grounds
include circumstances when a partner's conduct prejudicially affects the
business's operations and a partner willfully or persistently breaches the
partnership agreement or otherwise conducts himself so that it is not reasonably
practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him. 05
Section 601 of RUPA introduces a statutory mechanism for expelling a
partner in situations associated with deadlock: judicial dissociation.
Specifically, the other partners may sue to obtain a judicial expulsion if one of
these three conditions is satisfied: (1) the partner has engaged in wrongful
conduct that adversely and materially affected the partnership's business; (2)
the partner willfully or persistently violated the partnership agreement or the
fiduciary duties of a partner; os or (3) the partner's conduct makes it impractical
to carry on the business. Regarding dissolution, RUPA's grounds are broader
than those of UPA, including situations where "it is not otherwise reasonably
practicable to carry on the partnership business in conformity with the
partnership agreement." 07 Upon application for judicial dissolution by one of
105. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 32 (1914). Other grounds involve cases in which the business
of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss; a partner suffers from an incapacitating mental illness;
a partner becomes unable to perform her part of the partnership agreement; and application of the
assignee of a partner's interest or of a creditor who has obtained a charging order against a partner's
interest pursuant to UPA section 28. Id. Commentators recommend pursuing a judicial decree even if the
grounds for dissolution under UPA section 31 appear to be clear. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at
152-53. For instance, under UPA, withdrawing from the partnership triggers dissolution. However, an
actual buyout sale might be precluded if parties are deadlocked due to the unlikely cooperation from the
other party. See, e.g., Owen v. Cohen, 119 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1941); see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at
152-53.
106. See REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404 (1997).
107. Id. § 801(5) (stating that at-will or term partnerships can be dissolved by court
order in cases in which "(1) [t]he economic purpose of the partnership is likely to be unreasonably




the partners, a court may dissolve the partnership if "it is equitable to wind up
the partnership business." 08 For LLCs, a court may order dissolution upon
request by one or more of the members where the economic purpose of the
business has been frustrated or there has been serious misconduct by one or
more of the members.109
The implementation of judicial resolution of deadlock depends on whether
the case involves dissociation of a co-owner, dissolution of the firm with
business continuation, or dissolution without business continuation. 0 In
judicial dissociation under RUPA, a court-administered process under which
the other owners buy out the dissociating owner's interest (or both owners have
the right to buy out the other party) is implemented. Similar buyout processes
are used in dissolution with business continuation under UPA. In contrast,
dissolution without business continuation triggers a winding up process under
which the firm's business assets are distributed to the owners, under both UPA
and RUPA. Hence, the owners are entitled to have the business publicly sold on
either a going concern basis or through liquidation of individual assets.
B. Asset Valuation
A critical issue in dissociation and dissolution cases involving closely-held
business organizations is the valuation of the business assets. Two asset
valuation methods are typically used by American courts. First, courts might
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with that partner; or (3) it is not
otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the partnership business in conformity with the partnership
agreement").
108. Id. § 801(6).
109. As we mentioned before, most statutory rules regarding general partnerships and
LLCs are default rules that can be modified by the owners' agreements. For instance, the owners can
explicitly forego privately implemented Shotgun or other buyout mechanisms, specifying instead that
the members must seek judicial dissolution in the event of a deadlock. In Vila v. BVWebTies LLC,
section 10.02 of the LLC Agreement stated that "[the LLC shall be dissolved upon ... the entry of a
decree of judicial dissolution under the [Delaware Limited Liability Company] Act." No. 4308-VCS,
2010 WL 3866098, at *8 n.63 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2010). The court noted "[o]f course, the existence of a
deadlock would not necessarily justify dissolution if the LLC Agreement provided a means to resolve it
equitably. But the LLC Agreement does not contain a buy-sell arrangement or any other provision (such
as one providing for the appointment of an agreed-upon third manager) to resolve the deadlock." Id.
Note that the cost inefficiencies associated with the risk of piecemeal liquidation might motivate the
owners to explicitly waive their rights to judicial resolution, and instead include buy-sell clauses in their
business agreements from the beginning. In R&R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC,
the LLC operating agreement specified: "The Members agree that irreparable damage would occur if
any member should bring an action for judicial dissolution of the Company. Accordingly each
member ... waives and renounces such Member's right to seek a court decree of dissolution or to seek
the appointment by a court of a liquidator for the Company." No. 3803-CC., 2008 WL 3846318, at *3
(Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008). The Delaware Chancery Court upheld this contractual waiver. Id. at *1.
110. Remember that under UPA, dissociation always triggers dissolution, and
dissolution might involve business continuation. But, under RUPA, dissociation does not necessarily
trigger dissolution, and dissolution always involves a winding-up process (i.e., it does not allow for
business continuation). See supra Subsection II.A. I.
111. Court-appointed receivers or trustees generally conduct the winding-up process.
See, e.g., Mizrahi v. Cohen, 38 Misc. 3d 1213(A), No. 3865/10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 2013).
173
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 31, 2014
appoint an external appraiser to determine the value of the company assets, and
then implement a buyout process where a co-owner is given the option to
purchase the stake of the other owner at the appraised price.112 Second,
judicially-mandated auctions might be implemented. In Polikoff v. Levy, the
court found:
Where the co-venturers cannot agree on the method of sale at dissolution, a
public judicial sale is the only available method of conversion of the assets.
Equitable principles and possible unfavorable results of a forced judicial public
sale cannot compel disregard for the application of the ordinary and traditional
methods of final settlement of a business relationship." 3
Not surprisingly, it is common for the co-owners to exercise their rights to
participate in the judicial sales, entering bids for the purchase of the assets.114
C. Court Intervention with Shotgun Mechanisms
1. Ex Ante Private Design
Shotgun mechanisms are particularly appropriate when an outside market
for the asset does not exist and it is self-evident that one of the original owners
should continue with the business venture. Under these circumstances, an
auction is unlikely to attract serious bidders (other than the original owners
themselves). Further, a buyout mechanism that relies on asset valuation by an
external appraiser would be costly and potentially inaccurate. Simply put, when
the information and expertise is in the hands of the original owners, auctions
and external appraisals are a waste of time and money.
112. See Creel v. Lilly, 729 A.2d 385 (Md. 1999); Home v. Aune, 121 P.3d 1227
(Wash. Ct. App. 2005). Courts have recognized that sometimes the parties themselves are in the best
position to ascertain the value of the property, and hence, no external appraiser is required to establish
the fair market value of the business assets. See, e.g., Keenan v. Wade, 182 P.3d 1099, 1105 (Alaska
2008) ("Disotell did not create the 'requirement that the market value of property be proved by formal
appraisal' or even address 'whether it is error to reject a professional appraiser's opinion regarding the
value of real property in favor of the owner's opinion' . . . . Here, Wade's opinion of the value of
Keenan's lot is based on his knowledge of comparable sales of property.").
113. Polikoff v. Levy, 270 N.E.2d 540, 546 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971); see also McCormick v.
Brevig, 96 P.3d 697 (Mont. 2004).
114. See, e.g., Prentiss v. Sheffel, 513 P.2d 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (finding that the
partners' participation in the judicial auction enhanced the selling price of the assets). Note that the
presence of inside bids may chill the participation of outside bidders. Some courts, recognizing the
potential shortcomings of auctions, have tailored the implementation of the winding-up process to the
specific characteristics of the cases. See, e.g., Kelley v. Shay, 55 A. 925 (Pa. 1903) (finding that one of
the partners would be at a disadvantage in a judicial auction, and thus ordering the assets to be divided in
kind between the partners rather than auctioned); see also Logoluso v. Logoluso, 233 Cal. App. 2d 523
(1965) (eschewing a liquidation sale in favor of an in-kind distribution of the partnership assets).
115. The original owners may have acquired firm-specific capital and expertise that
would be lost if the firm were sold to a third party.
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Our analysis of privately-implemented deadlock resolution suggests that
Shotgun mechanisms lead to fair, expedient, and cost-efficient resolution of
business deadlock when the two parties are equally informed, equally capable,
and each has adequate financial resources. In the absence of asymmetries, it is
immaterial which party makes the offer and which party receives it, since the
mechanism ensures that the monetary value of the business is divided evenly.
As discussed earlier, there is a very real risk that the Shotgun mechanism can
generate inequitable outcomes when parties are asymmetric. When drafting
their initial business agreements, it is hard for co-venturers to foresee the
evolution of their relationship and their future circumstances. Over time, the
owners' management roles may change and adapt, their areas of specialization
may diverge, and their general capabilities may grow stronger with experience
or weaker with age. When including a Shotgun provision in the business
agreement, the owners should be aware that they are running the risk that the
provision may be used opportunistically and inappropriately, benefitting one
owner at the expense of the other.
2. Ex Post Judicial Design
Shotgun mechanisms are seldom used by judges in the United States when
resolving business deadlocks. The recent case of Fulk v. Washington Services
Associates, Inc. provides a rare example.16 Bernard Fulk and Laurence Long
were fifty-fifty shareholders in Washington Services Associates (WSA), a joint
venture. 17  There was no buy-sell provision in WSA's shareholder
agreement." 8 The Delaware Chancery Court appointed a receiver with
custodial powers to "formulate and execute a Plan of Sale that would maximize
the value to the shareholders in a judicially ordered sale of WSA."" 9 The
custodian argued that a sale to an outsider was very unlikely, "and, moreover,
that any bids by outsiders would probably be less than what either of the
current stockholders would be willing to pay. Accordingly, the Custodian
concluded that value would be maximized in a sale . . . to either of the two
stockholders, but not in a public auction."l20 The Custodian subsequently
recommended that:
[T]he Court order a purchase/sale process involving only the two stockholders,
Fulk and Long . . . . [O]ne of the two stockholders (the "offeror") stockholder
116. No. 17747-NC, 2002 WL 1402273 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002).
117. Id. at *1. Long was the operational owner, running the business; Fulk was the
financial owner. In addition, there were eight employees, including Long's children. Long and his
children had all of the intellectual capital, and they threatened to leave and compete if Fulk were to take
control. Id.
118. Id. at *7.
119. Id.at*1.
120. Id. at *5.
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would offer to purchase or sell his (or its) interest for a stated price. The other
("offeree") stockholder would then decide whether to buy or sell his (or its)
interest at the price established by the offeror stockholder. The Custodian
recommended [this method] as his preferred approach, with the Trust being the
offeror-stockholder and Fulk being the offeree, who would have the option to
buy or sell at the price established by the Trust.1 2 1
This mechanism was upheld by the judge under Delaware General Corporation
Law (DGCL) section 273.122
It is important to note that, while the risks associated with asymmetries
are certainly relevant for the use of Shotgun mechanisms in the judicial context,
these problems are likely to be less severe than in the private context. Since
courts have the ability to design the Shotgun mechanisms ex post rather than ex
ante, they may well have enough information to identify the presence of
asymmetries and tailor the Shotgun mechanism accordingly.
Consider the problem of asymmetric information where just one owner
can accurately assess the future value of the business. As explained before, a
fair outcome is achieved if the informed owner makes the buy-sell offer, since
the Shotgun mechanism creates an incentive for the owner to make an accurate
offer. Given that the circumstances leading to asymmetric information and
proxies for its presence may be difficult to foresee and describe ex ante, the
parties might not be able to correctly specify the role of offeror in their business
agreement. Ex post, however, the identity of the informed owner may be clear.
In this case, the implementation of judicially-mandated Shotgun mechanisms
where the informed owner makes the offer is feasible. 123
Similarly, courts might preclude the negative effects of asymmetric
financial resources by providing the parties with sufficient time to arrange for
financing of the buy-sell operations. Finally, courts might offset the weaknesses
related to asymmetric capabilities by assigning the role of offeror to the less
capable owner.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *11 ("[N]o cited Delaware case directly or inferentially prohibits this Court
from ordering a discontinuation of a joint venture on the terms the Custodian is proposing."). Although
this case involved a closely-held corporation, given that the asset valuation problem is also critical in
these types of business entities, we consider that this example is applicable. Note also that courts
frequently extend the application of corporate law to cases involving LLCs. In fact, regarding the
application of the corporate veil-piercing doctrine in the case of LLCs, the Wyoming Supreme Court
concluded in a leading decision: "We can discern no reason, in either law or policy, to treat LLCs
differently than we treat corporations." Kaycee Land and Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 327 (Wyo.
2002). Professor Bainbridge argues, "Admittedly, there is a certain intuitive logic to treating LLCs the
same way we do corporations . . . . [T]here is little direct evidence that legislatures intended to treat
LLCs and corporations differently .... As we have seen, the courts have blindly followed the corporate
law precedent." See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 194-95. In Bentas v. Haseotes, the court also
considered a Shotgun mechanism but decided that an auction was more appropriate to the specific
circumstances of the case. No. 17223 NC, 2003 WL 1711856 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2003).
123. It is also worth noting once again that with common values, a standard sealed-bid




In contrast to courts in the United States, Canadian judges frequently
apply Shotgun mechanisms in business divorce cases. For instance, in Kinzie v.
Dells Holdings, the court articulated the importance of careful judicial
implementation of the Shotgun mechanism:
In a 'shot gun' sale, the court must determine the party who will make the first
offer. Normally, the party who is in the best position to assess the value of the
business and determine the fair market value is ordered to make the initial
offer....
If either party is unable to obtain financing to complete the purchase of the
shares within the 90-day time limit, having made reasonable efforts to do so, the
[assets] shall be listed for sale on the open market with the parties having joint
conduct of sale.1
2 4
In addition to addressing the crucial aspect of offeror identification, the
Kinzie court was cognizant of the potential for financial constraints to frustrate
the implementation of the Shotgun mechanism. In particular, the court gave the
winning party a sufficiently long period of time to raise the necessary capital
and provided incentives for completion of the transaction through the threat of
an open-market sale.125
Finally, the judicial implementation of the Shotgun mechanism might
influence the private resolution of deadlock. If the Shotgun mechanism
becomes a commonly-applied valuation procedure in the judicial resolution of
business deadlocks, then even in the absence of privately contracted Shotgun
clauses, private resolution of deadlock will involve bargaining in the shadow of
the Shotgun mechanism. As a result, more equitable private outcomes might be
obtained.
IV. Ex Post Judicial Design of Shotgun Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence
Although our arguments regarding the benefits of ex post judicial design
of Shotgun mechanisms are logically consistent and supported by current legal
cases, actual field data on deadlock resolution processes and outcomes are not
124. 2010 BCSC 1360, paras. 31,34 (Can. B.C.). Similarly, in Lee & Lee v. Lee & Lee,
the court held that the parties with the greater expertise should be the ones to propose the price: "[T]he
respondents [appellants here] have been operating the restaurant for a considerable period of time and
they are in a far better position than the petitioners [respondents here] to fix a fair price." 2003 B.C.J.
1285, para. 11 (Can. B.C.). For additional examples of the judicial use of Shotgun mechanisms, see also
Whistler Service. Park Ltd. v. Glacier Creek Development., 2005 BCSC 1942 (Can. B.C.), and Safarik v.
Ocean Fisheries Ltd., (1996) 17 B.C.L.R. 3d 354 (Can. B.C.C.A.).
125. Id. paras. 25, 33. The popularity of these mechanisms in Canada, both in private
contracts and judicial implementation, goes hand-in-hand with the emergence of specialized financial
institutions such as the Shotgun Fund that provides capital to joint owners in such cases. See SHOTGUN
FUND, supra note 21.
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generally available. In these circumstances, experimental economics methods
are useful complements to theoretical analysis.
This Part reports the results from a series of experiments with human
subjects. We investigate whether the behavior of the subjects follows the
arguments presented in Part III. Specifically, we study whether the optimal ex
post judicial implementation of the Shotgun mechanism under asymmetric
information, i.e., the implementation that generates equitable outcomes,
requires the role of the offeror be assigned to the more informed owner.
Importantly, this setting also allows us to explore the private incentives of the
informed owners to truthfully reveal private information under the Shootout
clause, in environments where the role of offeror is assigned to the more
informed owner. We consider two different information treatments: Shotgun
mechanisms with the informed owner making a buy-sell offer (Informed
Offeror "10" environment), and Shotgun mechanisms with the uninformed
owner making a buy-sell offer (Uninformed Offeror "UO" environment).
Computational demands on the subjects are reduced by using a simple binary
setting with two business asset values. We minimize the use of labels and
terminology to facilitate subjects' understanding of the experimental
environment and tasks.126
A. Numerical Example
We follow the main features of the numerical example presented in
Section II.B.127 Specifically, we suppose that two owners have equal ownership
stakes in the company. If the owners stay together, the value of the business
assets is either low ($150) or high ($400). We suppose further that the
probabilities of encountering low and high values are 3/4 and 1/4, respectively.
If sole ownership is achieved, then the total value of the business assets
increases to $250 and $500, in the case of low and high initial values,
respectively. To reduce subjects' computational costs, we restrict the offer
prices to the following set: {$105, $125, $145, $230, $250, $270}.
HYPOTHESIS: Under asymmetric information, the assignment of the role of
offeror to the informed owner increases the likelihood of equitable allocations
when the value of the business assets is equal to $500. 128
126. Although our experiment cannot predict the effects of Shotgun mechanisms in
richer environments, the experiment can provide a reasonable amount of evidence regarding whether the
assignment of the role of the offeror to the informed owner in an environment similar to the one
structured here will have the predicted effects. If our findings in this simple environment do not conform
to the theory, it is very unlikely that this theory can explain behavior in more complex settings. Hence,
our experimental results might provide valuable information to theorists.
127. The Appendix presents a general analysis of the binary version of the model. A
complete set of instructions and software screens is available from the authors upon request.
128. When the value of the business assets is equal to $250, we expect that equitable




B. Games and Sessions
Subjects played eight practice rounds and sixteen actual rounds using
networked computer terminals.129 Before the beginning of the first actual
round, the computer randomly assigned a role to the subjects: Player 1 or
Player 2 (Player 1, the informed player, was the offeror in the 10 condition and
the offeree in the UO condition). Before the beginning of each actual round, the
computer also randomly formed pairs.130 Subjects were not paired with the
same partner in two immediately consecutive rounds. Then the computer
randomly chose the value of the business assets.131 This value was revealed
only to Player 1.132
The subjects played a two-stage game. In the first stage, the offeror made
a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other subject, the offeree.'33 The offeror chose
the offer price from the set {$105, $125, $145, $230, $250, $270} and the price
was then revealed to the offeree. In the second stage, the offeree was required
to respond to the offer by either buying or selling at the named price.
We ran four ninety-minute sessions (two sessions per condition, sixty-two
subjects in total) at the University of Alberta School of Business computer
laboratories. The information per condition (number of subjects, number of
pairs for the sixteen rounds) is as follows: (32, 256) and (30, 240), for the 10
and UO conditions, respectively.' 34 The subject pool (undergraduate and
graduate students from the University of Alberta) received their monetary payoffs
in cash ($17 CAD game earnings, on average) at the end of the session.135 Our
laboratory currency, the "token," was converted to Canadian dollars using a
commonly-known exchange rate.
129. Subjects were undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Alberta
recruited from electronic bulletin boards. Players were completely anonymous to one another. Hence,
this experimental environment did not permit the formation of reputations. The purpose of the practice
rounds was to allow subjects to become familiar with the structure of the game, with the consequences
of their choices and the choices of the other players, and with the likelihood of confronting low and high
types of business assets. During the practice rounds, subjects experienced each role four times.
130. Given the randomization process used to form pairs, and the diversity of offer
categories and prices that subjects confronted (due to the heterogeneity of offer categories and prices),
the sixteen actual rounds do not represent stationary repetitions of the game. Consequently, we can treat
each round as a one-shot experience.
131. The computer used the following probabilities: low value with probability 3/4, and
high value with probability 1/4.
132. Both players knew that Player 1 received this information.
133. In the UO condition, Player 2 (the uninformed player) was the offeror; and, in 10
conditions, Player 1 (the informed player) was the offeror.
134. In addition to these sessions, we ran several pilot sessions.
135. Subjects also received a $10 CAD participation fee.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Informed-Offeror Treatment
Asset Value
250 500
Price Offered"' 125.00 250.00
143.76 214.11
(38.46) (50.24)
Buy Rate .69 .23
Offeror's Payoff 112.99 242.18
(41.09) (61.41)
Offeree's Payoff 137.01 257.82
(41.09) (61.41)
Equitable Allocations Rate .60 .40
Observations(b) 194 62
Note: a Mode and mean prices are presented in the first and second rows,
respectively; (b) sample sizes correspond to the number of pairs for the sixteen
rounds; standard deviations are presented in parentheses; for each condition, the
buy rates are computed across all prices offered.
C. Results
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the 10 experimental
treatment. Information about the mode and mean offers is provided. The buy
rate is defined as the percentage of total pairs in which the offeree decided to
buy his partner's business assets.m The equitable allocation rate is defined as
the percentage of total pairs in which each owner's payoff represented 50% of
the business assets. 138
Our results indicate that informed offerors generally reveal their private
information by offering a mean price of $144 when the value of the business
assets was $250 and a mean price of $214 when the value of the assets was
$500. Our findings also suggest that equitable outcomes might be generated
under asymmetric information when the ex post design of the Shotgun
mechanism involves the informed owners making the buy-sell offers.
Specifically, equitable allocations occurred in 60% and 40% of the total cases,
when the value of the business assets was equal to $250 and $500,
136. Given the consistency of the aggregate data across rounds since early stages, we
decided to include the sixteen rounds in our analysis. The qualitative results still hold when only the last
eight rounds of play are considered.
137. The buy rates correspond to all prices proposed by the offerors.
138. The equitable payoffs are equal to $125 and $250 when business assets values




respectively.' 39 These results are aligned with our logical arguments and
predictions.
The responses of the uninformed owners are also aligned with our
predictions: when the informed owner proposed a price of $125, the
uninformed owner generally bought his partner's assets (90% of the total
cases); when the informed owner proposed a price of $250, the uninformed
owner generally sold his assets to his partner (97% of the total cases).
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the Uninformed-Offeror Treatment
Asset Value
250 500
Price Offered"' 125.00 125.00
137.26 140.00
(34.86) (39.55)
Buy Rate .49 .97
Offeror's Payoff 112.74 139.34
(34.86) (37.64)
Offeree's Payoff 137.26 360.66
(34.86) (37.64)
Equitable Allocations Rate .82 .07
Observations(b 179 61
Note: () Mode and mean prices are presented in the first and second rows,
respectively; (b) sample sizes correspond to the number of pairs for the 16 rounds;
standard deviations are presented in parentheses; for each condition, the buy
rates are computed across all prices offered.
Table 4 outlines the descriptive statistics for the UO experimental
treatment. Our findings are aligned with our logical arguments and predictions:
the mode offer was $125 (81% of the total cases, across asset values).140 Our
results also suggest that inequitable outcomes occurred under asymmetric
information when the uninformed owners are assigned the role of offeror.
Specifically, when the business assets value was $500, equitable allocations
occurred only in 7% of the total cases.141 Our findings suggest that the ex post
implementation of Shotgun mechanisms under asymmetric information will
139. On average (across assets values), the offeror's and offeree's payoffs were equal to
$144 and $166, respectively.
140. The responses of the informed owners are also aligned with our predictions: when
the uninformed owner proposed a price of $125, the informed owner bought his partner's assets in 59%
of the total cases, and sold his business assets to his partner in 41% of the cases; when the uninformed
owner proposed a price of $250, the informed owner sold his assets to his partner in 100% of the total
cases.
141. In 80% of the total cases, the informed offeree got a payoff of $375, when the
value of the business assets was $500.
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produce equitable outcomes only under the assignment of the role of offeror to
the better-informed owner.
Next, we use regression analysis to more thoroughly test the effects of
role assignment on the likelihood of equitable allocations of the business assets
between the informed and uninformed owners, when business assets equal
$500. Our analysis involves robust standard errors that account for the possible
dependence of observations within sessions. We take pairs of conditions and
estimate a probit model. This model includes a treatment dummy variable as its
142
regressor.






Note: The columns report the effects on the uninformed player's payoff due to
assigning the role of offeror to the informed Player I (probit analysis using sessions
as clusters); robust standard error is in parenthesis; *denotes significance at the 5%
level; observations correspond to number of pairs.
Table 5 indicates that the assignment of the role of offeror to the informed
player significantly increased the likelihood of equitable allocations, with
respect to the uninformed offeror environment (p = .02).143 In fact, as a result of
the assignment of the role of offeror to the informed owner, a higher likelihood
of equitable allocations is observed: 40% versus 7%, for the IO and UO
conditions, respectively. Thus, there is clear support for our Hypothesis.
RESULT: When the value of the business assets is $500, the assignment of the
role of offeror to the informed owner significantly increases the equitable
allocation rate.
D. Discussion
Our insights regarding the appropriate judicial design of Shotgun
mechanisms are largely confirmed by our laboratory experiments. Our
experimental results supported our arguments: inequitable outcomes were
obtained when the uninformed owner made the buy-sell offer and equitable
142. The dummy variable takes a value of I if the observation pertains to the 10
condition, and a value of 0 if the observation pertains to the UO condition. The probit model also
includes the round number as an additional explanatory variable to control for learning effects across
rounds. Data for the 10 and UO (when business assets equal $500) are pooled.




outcomes were obtained when the informed owner made the buy-sell offer.
When making the buy-sell offer, the informed owner was likely to tell the truth,
placing a bid that reflected the true value of the assets. Importantly, assigning
the role of offeror to the informed owner significantly increased the uninformed
owner's payoff. The theoretical and experimental findings presented here
provide cost-efficiency, equity, and expediency rationales for the judicial
design and implementation of Shotgun mechanisms in the resolution of
business deadlocks.
The interests of the business parties and, more generally, the interest of
society as a whole will be served by the appropriate judicial use of Shotgun
mechanisms.
VI. Conclusion
This Article advances a proposal to reform the way that courts resolve
business deadlocks. We present an economic argument for the use of the
Shotgun mechanism as an asset valuation procedure in the case of judicially-
implemented dissociation or dissolution processes, and demonstrate the
alignment of this cake-cutting mechanism with current statutory rules and case
law. General partnerships and LLCs, the most commonly chosen legal entities,
are the focus of this study.
Our study of the private design and implementation of Shotgun provisions
provides relevant insights for the judicial resolution of business deadlock with
Shotgun mechanisms. Shotgun provisions have several desirable properties.
First, under the right circumstances, the Shotgun mechanism leads to a fair and
equitable division of the assets. Second, Shotgun provisions are expedient. In
contrast to standard negotiations where there are offers and counteroffers, one
party can unilaterally trigger the Shotgun provision and force the timely
transfer of assets. Third, Shotgun provisions are cost-efficient because they do
not require the participation of a costly outside appraiser or auctioneer. Under
the wrong conditions, however, Shotgun provisions can backfire. We show that
asymmetries between the business owners in terms of information, capabilities,
and financial resources might elicit unwanted strategic behavior and
opportunism, and hence lead to inequitable outcomes in the private application
of Shotgun mechanisms.
Our analysis indicates that the desirable properties of the Shotgun
mechanism observed in private settings are also relevant to judicial settings
when courts are involved in resolving business disputes. Importantly, we show
that the risks associated with asymmetries are often less severe than they are in
the private context. Since courts have the ability to design the Shotgun
procedure ex post rather than ex ante, they are in a better position to identify
the presence and nature of asymmetries and tailor the Shotgun mechanism
accordingly.
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In addition to their logical consistency, and the support from the legal
cases discussed in Part III, our arguments regarding the benefits of ex post
design of Shotgun mechanism are largely confirmed in the laboratory.
Specifically, when asymmetric information is present, Shotgun mechanisms
might generate inequitable outcomes. Courts, however, can reduce the negative
effects of asymmetric information by assigning the role of offeror to the
informed owner. Under this design of Shotgun mechanisms, equity is restored.
Our logical arguments and our experimental findings provide strong rationales
for the judicial design and implementation of Shotgun mechanisms in the
resolution of business deadlocks.
Our analysis demonstrates that that the adequate judicial implementation
of the Shotgun mechanism as an asset valuation procedure will benefit the
parties themselves as well as the society more broadly. Courts should include
the Shotgun mechanism in their deadlock resolution "toolbox," and use their






This Appendix supplements the discussion of Shotgun mechanisms with
asymmetric information presented in Part II by fully characterizing the
equilibrium strategies and outcomes.
Suppose that two co-venturers own equal stakes in a firm with uncertain
value x in the set {XL, XH} = {$150, $400}. OL = 3/4 is the likelihood that x =
$150 and OH = 1/4 is the complementary probability that x = $400. The
informed player, whom we refer to as Owner 1, knows the true value of x; the
uninformed owner, Owner 2, does not observe the value. Thus, this game has
one-sided asymmetric information with common values. As in the text, we
assume that there is a business deadlock; the assets will be more valuable if
ownership is consolidated. Resolving the deadlock will create an additional a =
$100 of value, so after the consolidation of ownership the assets are worth x + a
in the set {$250, $500}. We let p represent the buy-sell offer. If Owner I
purchases Owner 2's stake, the payoff for Owner 1 is x + a - p and the payoff
for Owner 2 is p. The equilibrium concept is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
A. Shotgun Mechanisms with Informed Offeror
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose the informed Owner I makes the buy-sell offer.
There is a fully-separating equilibrium where Owner I offers p; = $125 when x
+ a = $250 and pi = $250 when x + a = $500, and Owner 2 buys when p; =
$125 and sells when p; = $250.144 The value of the business assets is shared
equally by the two owners.
PROOF: First consider the informed Owner's offer. If Owner 1's equilibrium
proposal is pi(x) = (x + a)/2 then Owner 2 should be indifferent between
buying and selling, since Owner 2's payoff would be (x+a)/2 in either case. So
it is rational for Owner 2 to buy when p, = $125 and sell when p, = $250. Note
that it would not be optimal for Owner 1 to offer p, = $125 when x + a = $500
since Owner 2 would buy Owner l's stake, leaving Owner 1 with a net payoff
of $125. Similarly, Owner 1 would not offer pt= $250 when x + a = $250 since
Owner 2 would sell and Owner 1 would receive a net payoff of zero dollars.' 45
144. This separating equilibrium with p, in the set {$125, $250} can be supported in
other ways as well. For example, it is also an equilibrium for Owner 2 to randomize fifty-fifty between
buying and selling shares at each price offer. This mixed strategy is, however, weakly dominated by the
strategies outlined in the proposition.
145. If Owner 2 observes an out-of-equilibrium offer p' in the range ($125, $250), then
Owner 2 believes that the expected value of the assets is 2p*. With these beliefs, Owner 2 is indifferent
between buying and selling and may randomize between buying and selling. Offers in this range are
unprofitable for Owner 1.
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Thus, the strategies outlined in the Proposition constitute a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. .
B. Shotgun Mechanisms with Uninformed Offeror
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose the uninformed Owner 2 makes the buy-sell offer.
In equilibrium, Owner 2 offers p2 = $125. Owner 1 may either buy Owner 2's
stake or sell his stake to Owner 2 ifx + a = $250, and will buy Owner 2's stake
if x + a = $500. The value of the business assets is shared unequally, with
Owner 1 receiving a higher payoff on average than Owner 2.
PROOF: Any offer not equal to $125 or $250 is dominated for Owner 2, and so
we can limit our attention to price offers P2 in the set {$125, $250}.14 If Owner
2 makes a buy-sell offer P2 = $125 then Owner 2 will receive payoff of $125
regardless of the true value of the business assets. To see why, suppose that x +
a = $500, and that Owner 1 knows this. Owner 1 would certainly choose to buy
Owner 2's stake at P2 = $125, giving Owner 1 a payoff of $500 - $125 = $375
and Owner 2 a payoff of $125. If x + a = $250, however, then Owner I would
be indifferent between buying and selling his stake at a price of P2 = $125 and,
in either case, Owner 2 receives a payoff of $125. Owner 2 will earn a lower
payoff on average if he proposes P2 = $250. At this lower price, Owner I is
indifferent between buying and selling if x + a = $500, giving Owner 2 a payoff
of $250. If x + a = $250, however, then Owner 1 would certainly choose to sell
his stake to Owner 2. The latter scenario is more likely and, on average, Owner
2 can expect to earn a payoff of (.25)($250) + (.75)($250 - $250) = $62.5 when
he offers P2 = $250. Owner l's average payoff is higher than that of Owner 2,
(.25)($250) + (.75)($250) = $250..
C. Point Predictions
Table Al summarizes the point predictions. Consider the top half of the
table. When the offeror is the informed player, the offeror makes an offer equal
to $125 when x + a = $250, and an offer equal to $250 when x + a = $500. The
uninformed offeree buys when the price is equal to $125, and sells when the
price is equal to $250. Now consider the bottom half of the table. When the of-
feror is the uninformed player, the offeror makes an offer equal to $125. When
x + a = $250, the informed offeree is indifferent between buying and selling.
When x + a = $500, the offeree decides to buy. As a result, inequitable payoffs
are observed in the case of uninformed offerors.
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146. Suppose P2 > $250. Owner I would strictly prefer to sell his shares regardless of
the true value of the assets for all offers above $250, prompting Owner 2 to reduce the offer. Suppose P2
< $125. Owner I would strictly prefer to buy shares at this price, prompting Owner 2 to raise the offer.
Offers $125 < P2< $250 are similarly dominated.
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Table Al: Point Predictions for Shotgun Mechanisms Under Asymmetric
Information
Asset Value
x + a = 250 x + a = 500
Informed Offeror
Buy-Sell Price 125 250
Response Buy Sell
Offeror's Payoff 125 250
Offeree's Payoff 125 250
Uninformed Offeror
Buy-Sell Price 125 125
Response Buy or Sell Buy
Offeror's Payoff 125 125
Offeree's Payoff 125 375
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